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PRIVACY AND SOCIAL CONTRACT: A
DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN PRIVACY
CASES
Kevin W. Saunders*
One of the central issues in political debate over the past several decades
has been the question of whether or not the courts are justified in voiding
statutes that do not run afoul of any explicit constitutional limitation on the leg-
islative power.' The debate has pitted those who assert that our culture's
commitment to democracy requires that the legislative power be supreme,2 at
least when not in conflict with the Constitution, against those who argue that
other values, most notably justice, dictate a more active role for the courts.3
While the argument often proceeds in historical or constitutional terms, it
is, in fact, a philosophical debate. By asking whether the courts ought to play
an expansive or only a limited role, one raises an issue of political philosophy.
Answering that democracy requires the role be limited is dispositive, only if the
requirements of democracy are taken as normative 4 If democratic values are
not normative, the "answer" is, in fact, only a statement that a system with an
activist judiciary is less, or non, democratic. Similarly, arguing that our his-
tory dictates a particular role suffices only if historical conclusions are taken as
being normative. Even an appeal to the Constitution requires that the
Constitution be accepted as normative.
Accepting democratic values and the Constitution as having normative
content would seem noncontroversial. Philosophical arguments might be
offered for majority rule. While limitations on that rule may also be argued
for, one might assert that democratic values are normative in the sense that, to
the extent that a practice furthers democracy without negatively affecting cer-
tain other values, that practice furthers some moral good.
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. A.B., Franklin & Marshall College,
M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami, J.D., University of Michigan. The author wishes to
thank Professors William A. Grimes, Kenneth Kress, Rodney A. Smolla and Harry F. Tepker
for their willingness to read and comment on earlier drafts of this Article and also to thank his
research assistant Stephen Glover.
1. See infra notes 95-241 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 189-241 and accompanying text.
4. "Requires" here is used normatively. One might argue that democracy requires a
passive court in the sense that only such a court is consistent with the theory of democracy.
Similarly, a constitution could require a passive court to be consistent with the theory of that
document. To make the normative claim that a court ought to be passive, the theory of
democracy or of the constitution under consideration must have normative power.
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The normative content of the Constitution requires some additional
explanation. The fact that the rules embodied in the Constitution were drafted
and accepted by the Framers makes them normative, only if one accepts the
rule that whatever the Framers took as norms worthy of incorporating in the
Constitution are normatively binding on later generations. That argument
would appear difficult to make. Instead, one must argue either that the dictates
of the Constitution have normative strength, independent of the fact that they
are contained in the Constitution, or that the Constitution as a whole derives
normative strength from some source, such as the present consent of the people
to be ruled under it.
If the democratic principle of majority rule, limited by constitutional
norms, is to be countered, so as to allow the judiciary to declare invalid statutes
on other than a constitutional basis, the argument must rest on philosophical
grounds as strong as those on which democracy rests. The grounds to be
offered here are those of the social contract and the consent of the governed to
be ruled under the contract. Those principles dictate that the will of the major-
ity be controlled not only by the Constitution, but also by other non-constitu-
tional bounds; and that the courts, rather than the legislatures, are the proper
entities to define those bounds.
A pure democratic principle requires that the courts never override a
democratic legislature and holds that the legitimacy of government rests on the
supremacy of that branch. A constitutional democratic principle allows the
courts to override the outcome of the democratic process, but only when the
constitution explicitly bars that outcome. A court employing an implicit or
penumbral bar reduces or destroys the legitimacy of the government.
The principles asserted in this Article lead to the conclusion that the
legitimacy of government requires that the courts at least consider bars to some
democratic outcomes. If those bars may be found in constitutional penumbrae,
that may help the policital acceptance of the court's decision. If the penumbra
argument is strained, that affects political acceptance, but the courts must still
be willing to consider voiding the statute. The legitimacy of government
demands that the courts be willing to go beyond constitutional checks in
protecting the individual from the political process.
There are two ways in which the nature of the argument offered here
might be unclear. First, while purporting to present a philosophical argument,
there are references both to history and to the current strength of our society's
commitment to government by the consent of the governed. Purely jurispru-
dential arguments may be offered that only consent of the governed legitimates
a government, 5 but consent theory has also had its critics. 6 Rather than joining
that debate,7 this Article begins with the assumption that a government is legit-
5. This is the theory of the Declaration of Independence and of the philosopher John
Locke. See Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Government, 18 GA. L. REV.
791, 791-92 (1984). See also AJ. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL
OBLIGATIONS 57-74 (1979).
6. For early criticism, see Hume, Of the Original Contract, in HUME'S ETHICAL
WRrINGS 255 (A. Maclntyre ed. 1965).
7. See generally Simmons, supra note 5.
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imate only when rule is by the consent of the governed.8 The philosophical
aspects of the argument then provide the steps from that assumption to the con-
clusion that legitimacy also requires an activist judiciary in the privacy cases.
The role of the historical and political material is to show that society
agrees with the assumption on which the Article is based. Whiie that does not
establish the validity of the assumption, the relationship shown between consent
and judicial activism should lead a society so committed to the conclusion that
legitimacy also requires activism. The argument is, then, conditional. If a
society is committed to the necessity of government by consent, then that soci-
ety must, to be consistent, also be committed to judicial activism in the privacy
arena. Our society is so committed to government by consent, hence, our soci-
ety must accept an active role for the judiciary.
This argument, even based on an assumption, is stronger than its
strongest counterargument, the argument from democracy.9 That argument
also generally begins with an assumption - the value of democracy - and
argues from demo6racy to establish legislative supremacy.'0 Yet, society's
commitment to government by consent appears to be stronger than its commit-
ment to democracy.' Furthermore, at least one of the arguments for the value
of democracy rests on the theory that it establishes consent,12 so consent would
appear to be the more basic value.
The second way in which the nature of the argument might be unclear is
in its mix of philosophical argument with constitutional cites. The argument is
not that the Constitution establishes an activist judiciary; neither is the argument
from democracy an argument that the Constitution explicitly bars an activist
judiciary.' 3 Each is extra-constitutional. The argument from democracy con-
tends that whatever constitutional provision an activist attempts to employ to
invalidate a statute, unless the authority is explicit, it is unacceptable as violating
the principle of democracy. The argument from consent contends that activism
is required. Constitutional cites provide only the location of some non-explicit
points of attachment to the Constitution, if such attachment is politically
necessary.
The argument begins with an examination of the privacy cases and the
recognition that the claims raised in those cases are best seen as claims about the
power of the legislature under the social contract. The argument offered by
those who use the value of democracy to further legislative supremacy is then
examined to see what accounts for its strength, why its opponents have been
8. Much of the criticism of this position is due to the impossibility of showing any
actual or tacit consent on the part of the governed. See infra notes 67 & 248 and accompanying
text. Recognizing this impossibility, this Article proceeds along the lines of hypothetical
consent. See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L. 1, 2-3 (1971) ("We need not pause here to examine the philosophical underpinnings of that
assumption [of majority rule] since it is a 'given' in our society....').
11. See infra notes 162-72 & 242-47 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Miller, The Ghostly Body Politic: The Federalist Papers and Popular
Sovereignty, 16 POL. THEORY 99, 101 (Feb. 1988) (defending democracy because it
establishes the consent favored by the Federalists).
13. See infira notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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unsuccessful in countering it, and to examine the character of any argument
likely to be strong enough to overcome it. The concepts of consent to be gov-
erned and the social contract are then examined for strength as normative con-
cepts. Concluding that these concepts do have normative strength points to the
need for further examination of the contract and the parties thereto. Lastly, the
understanding gained of the contract leads to a conclusion as to who should
interpret the contract and determine the limits on legislative authority.
I. PRIVACY AS A SOCIAL CONTRACT ISSUE
An individual asserting a privacy interest may be making any of a wide
variety of claims. 14 One such class of claims, not of great interest to constitu-
tional law, consists of claims of private, non-governmental violations of some
right.iS These claims are the stuff of the privacy torts.16 But even those consti-
tutional privacy claims that may be asserted only against the government admit
of differing varieties.17
Privacy claims asserted against the government fall into two classes. 18
Both classes protect the individual against government intrusion, but differ in
14. Professor Parker lists ten categories of privacy claims, before going on in search of
unifying principles: interference with family or home life, interference with physical or moral
integrity or moral and intellectual freedom, an attack on reputation or honor, false light, the
embarrassing and irrelevant disclosure of facts about an individual, the use of a person's name
or identity or likeness, spying on or besetting an individual, interference with correspondence,
misuse of a person's private communications, and the disclosure of information in violation of
professional confidentiality. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 277(1974) (citing Conclusions of the Nordic Conference on the Right of Privacy, in PRIVACY AND
THE LAW, A REPORT BY THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF
JUSTICE 45 (Littman & Carter-Rusk eds. 1970)). Even Parker's list may not be exhaustive,
unless the entries are read broadly enough that, for example, personal autonomy (see infra notes
24-39 and accompanying text) could be included within physical or moral integrity or moral and
intellectual freedom.
Professor Henkin notes several meanings that may be given to a privacy claim, even
when privacy is seemingly restricted to the right to be let alone. The claimed right may be:
a right to be alone, to be free from unwanted intrusion, to be secreted and
secretive; a right to be unknown ("incognito"), free from unwanted information in
the hands of others, unwanted scrutiny, unwanted "publicity"; a right to
"intimacy" and a freedom to do intimate things[;] ... a right to be free from
physical, mental, or spiritual violation, a right to the "integrity" of one's
"personality."
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419 (1974).
15. A constitutional interest may, even here, be implicated where a right is judicially
enforced. Legal resolution of a conflict between an individual's interest in keeping information
private and the interest of the press in publishing that information may raise first amendment
concerns.
16. See, e.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OFTORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
17. Rights of privacy that may be asserted against non-governmental actors might also
be argued to fall into the two classes presented, infra, at text accompanying notes 18-20, but the
claims would not be constitutional claims.
18. See, e.g., Allen, Taking Liberties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract
Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 461 (1987) ('Privacy' can refer either to conditions of
restricted access or to decisionmaking free from coercive interference."); Rubenfeld, The Right
of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740 (1989) (comparing privacy in its informational sense
and in its sense as immunizing conduct from sanction by the state); D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 243-44 (1986) (comparing informational privacy and that privacy that
is central to moral independence).
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the nature of the intrusion. One class consists of claims that access to places or
information ought to be restricted.19 The other class consists of claims to the
right to make decisions free from government interference. 2o
Informational and access privacy claims have long been recognized2l and
have a firm constitutional foundation. The third, fourth and fifth amendments,
and perhaps the first amendment, may be viewed as protecting informational
privacy. The fourth amendment, in protecting one's person, house and papers
from unreasonable searches and seizures, serves as a limit on government
access and limits the methods by which information about the individual may be
gathered. The third amendment limitation on the quartering of troops protects
against intrusion into the area of one's house, and the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination provides another limitation on gathering information.
The first amendment may also further informational privacy by providing
freedom to publish or speak anonymously and to not disclose one's religion or
associations.22
The other class of privacy claims against the government is less firmly
established in the Constitution23 and may seem to be of more recent vintage 24
Justice Douglas, in Griswold v. Connecticut25 found within the "penumbra" of
various amendments to the Constitution a right of privacy that prevented the
State of Connecticut from interfering with the decision of a married couple to
use contraceptive devices. The privacy asserted was not a claim that there
should be a limit on the information or locations to which the government
might enjoy access. Rather, Justice Douglas found a right to be free from gov-
ernment interference or coercion in making certain decisions 2 6
While the two classes of privacy claims differ, Justice Douglas glossed
over that difference in establishing the privacy protected by Griswold.27 He
cited to the third, fourth and fifth amendments, 28 but those amendments are
better viewed as concerned with informational and access privacy.29 His cite to
19. See Allen, supra note 18, at 464; Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 740; D. RICHARDS,
supra note 18, at 243.
20. See Allen, supra note 18, at 465-66; Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 740; D.
RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 243-44.
21. See Henkin, supra note 14, at 1420 ("From the beginning, indisputably, the
Constitution has protected some elements of 'privacy' even narrowly defined.").
22. See Henkin, supra note 14, at 1420.
23. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
24. See Henkin, supra note 14, at 1421 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965)) ("A constitutional 'Right of Privacy,' eo nomine and fundamental, was born in 1965.").
But see infra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Id. at 485-86. See also infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
27. See Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 43, 84 ("[A]lthough the privacy label is tossed about
loosely as though it had some intrinsic meaning, what was at issue in Griswold was not repose,
or an immunity against having personal data about oneself disclosed, or protection against state
invasion of the home. What was at issue was a particular freedom of action.').
28. 381 U.S. at 484.
29. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. See also Perry, Substantive Due
Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 417, 440 &
n.153 (1977) (noting the distinction between two classes of privacy rights and placing Griswold
on one side of the distinction and the fourth, fifth and, perhaps, first and third amendments on
the other); Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT.
1991]
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the first amendment freedom of association may fare no better?0 His cites to
Pierce v. Society of Sisters31 and Meyer v. Nebraska,32 while sometimes criti-
cized as a reinvocation of substantive due process,33 were at least directed to the
right he sought-to establish. Each case served to protect a right to make deci-
sions, free from government interference, with respect to certain aspects of
one's children's education.
The term "privacy" as a label for the freedom from government inter-
ference in certain individual choices has become firmly affixed,34 despite the
confusion engendered by the label.35 Justices, judges and commentators, in
some cases motivated by a desire to clear the confusion, have suggested various
substitute labels for the right at issue in Griswold and its progeny. A partial list
includes: "personhood," 36 "autonomy," 37 "freedom of action"38 and "the right
REV. 173, 199 (arguing that, while the fourth amendment may be broad enough to include the
concealment of information, it does not protect the sort of decision given protection by
Griswold),
30. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
31. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (cited in 381 U.S. at 482).
32. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (cited in 381 U.S. at 482).
33. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 29, at 195-96.
34. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court agreed with the position that "the
right of privacy ... is broad enough to cover the abortion decision...." Id. at 155. Conversely,
but using the same terminology, the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
declined to extend the right of privacy to insulate one from state proscription of homosexual
activities. The Court also spoke in terms of privacy when it protected the right of unmarried
individuals to decide whether to use contraceptives. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453
(1972).
35. In his Roe v. Wade dissent, Justice Rehnquist, while recognizing that the majority
might be discussing the insulation of the abortion decision from state coercion, professed to have
difficulty finding "privacy" even involved in the case, noting that "privacy" must not be being
used in its ordinary or even its fourth amendment sense. 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Even in the majority opinion in Roe, Justice Blackmun wrote that "[tihe pregnant
woman cannot be isolated [from her fetus] in her privacy" and that such a "woman's right to
privacy is no longer sole." Id. at 159. While Justice Blackmun may well have been stating only
that the right to decisional privacy is reduced as others become affected by the decision, the
language he used has led at least one commentator to the conclusion that he "conflate[d]
restricted access privacy rights with decisional privacy rights." Allen, supra note 18, at 468.
This confusion may be understandable, since the place in which an act occurs may be a
factor in the determination of whether or not the act (in the particular location) should be
insulated from state proscription. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), where the
Supreme Court of Alaska found in the Alaska Constitution a privacy right to the possession and
consumption of marijuana in one's home. While the language of the opinion indicates that the
privacy right under consideration is that of decisional privacy, the court found relevant the
location in which that claimed right was exercised, and stated that such privacy rights were at
their strongest when exercised in the home. Id. at 502-03. Furthermore, the two classes may be
viewed as protecting similar interests. Each right removes something, either information or
decisions, from public concern.
Professor Richards argues that both protect the same interests. He sees decisional
privacy as protecting the individual's right to conscience. The same interest is protected by
informational privacy, because the gathering of private information serves to control the
individual's exercise of moral power and stifles moral independence. D. RICHARIS, supra note
18, at 243.
36. Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699, 701;
Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 752. Professors Craven and Rubenfeld both note Professor
Freund's use of "personhood" in P. Freund, Address to the American Law Institute (May 23,
1975), quoted in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 52D ANNUAL MEETING 42-43 (1975).
37. Henkin, supra note 14, at 1424-25.
38. Dixon, supra note 27, at 84; Posner, supra note 29, at 195.
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to be let alone."39 Rather than adding an alternative label for the right of deci-
sional privacy, this Article provides an alternative description of what is at
issue in the privacy cases. The alternative description leads to a different
understanding of the issue as to who should resolve the claim.
The assertion of a decisional privacy right may be seen as a claim about
the nature of social contract. The claimant asserts that the right to regulate
activity within the sphere at issue is not one of the rights given the sovereign
under the social contract. The action is said to be private in the sense that it is
not the legitimate concern of the government. The claim is that the decision is
to be free, and that the individual should be allowed to exercise "autonomy" and
to develop his or her "personhood" through making individual decisions of con-
science. To use the two remaining labels, an individual has "freedom of action"
under the contract and has a social contract "right to be let alone."
Employing the theory of social contract, the Griswold line of cases is
seen as part of a much longer line.40 In Supreme Court opinions, the line
stretches back to Calder v. Bull 4 1 In that 1798 opinion, Justice Chase wrote:
The purposes for which men enter into society will deter-
mine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are
the foundation of legislative power, they will decide what are the
proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power will
limit the exercise of it.... An act of the legislature (for I cannot
call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative
authority. 42
Justice Chase's position seems clear: the social compact or contract
empowers the legislature to enact certain varieties of legislation; legislation
outside the power granted under the contract is without authority.43
Justice Field, in dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases," argued that the
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment "assumes that
39. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 207 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Olmstead concerned a wiretap, so Justice Brandeis, despite the fact that his language may be
read broadly to include decisional privacy, may have been writing more in terms of informational
privacy.
40. Certainly others have seen Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade as part of a
longer line but usually in criticism of the decisions. The line is one that is traced back to the
substantive due process cases and claimed to be a revival of the approach taken in the discredited
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 514-16 (Black,
J., dissenting).
41. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). Philosophical discussion of the social contract has
even older roots. See infra notes 76-80 & 262-71 and accompanying text.
42. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.). The opinions of each of the
Justices participating were presented seriatim.
43. Even Justice Iredell, writing in opposition to the approach taken by Justice Chase,
seemed more concerned with the ability of the courts to discover principles of "natural justice"
than with the proposition that natural justice or social contract might serve, in the abstract, as a
limitation on legislative power. Id. at 398-99 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
44. Butchers' Benevolent Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-
House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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there are such privileges and immunities which belong of right to citizens as
such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by state legislation.... The
privileges and immunities designated are those which of right belong to the citi-
zens of all free governments." 45 Justice Bradley took a similar dissenting posi-
tion, writing: "[T]here are certain fundamental rights which [the state's] right of
regulation cannot infringe.... I speak now of the rights of citizens of any free
government." 46 Both Justice Field and Justice Bradley argued that the legisla-
ture lacked the power to abridge certain rights. Those rights were not to be
found only in the text of the Constitution, but seemed to come from natural law
or social contract theory. The difference between the Slaughterhouse dissents
and Justice Chase's Calder v. Bull position was that Justices Field and Bradley
then had the text of the privileges and immunities clause within which to
attempt to incorporate social contract limitations.
Social contract language reached a majority opinion in Citizens' Savings
& Loan Association v. Topeka.47 Justice Miller, writing for the Court, stated:
It must be conceded that there are ... rights in every free
government beyond the control of the State.... There are limita-
tions on [government] power which grow out of the essential
nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual
rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and which
are respected by all governments entitled to the name 8
The Court clearly believed that the social contract served as a limitation
on government power. Furthermore, it did not restrict itself to those aspects of
social contract found in the text of the Constitution but argued instead in terms
of theoretical principles. 49
Two years later, in Munn v. Illinois,50 Justice Waite, in his majority
opinion wrote:
"A body politic ... is a social compact by which the whole people
covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people,
that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good."
This does not confer power upon the whole people to control
rights which are purely and exclusively private .... 51
Once again the Court offered a clear view that under the social contract
the power of the legislature is limited, and once again the limitations did not
appear to be confined to those found in the text of the Constitution.
While the language of social contract has disappeared from modem
opinions, Griswold, Roe v. Wade,52 Bowers v. Hardwick53 and the other cases
discussing decisional privacy are the progeny of those earlier cases. They too
45. Id. at 96-97 (Field, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 114 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
47. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875).
48. Id. at 662-63.
49. These limitations "grow out of the essential nature of all free governments." Id.
50. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
51. Id. at 124 (quoting Preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts) (citation
omitted).
52. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Roe, 410 U.S. 113. See also supra note 34.
53. 478 U.S. 186. See supra note 34.
818 [VOL. 33
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consider the claim that certain legislative acts may be invalid because they are
beyond the power of the legislature. The acts are argued to be beyond the
power of the legislature, not because they contradict some explicit provision of
the Constitution, but rather because they violate some principle regarding the
rightful province of government in the lives of individuals.54
Once again, it should be emphasized that recasting the issue in terms of
social contract is not motivated solely by the position that it provides a more
accurate label. It is the position of this Article that the social contract descrip-
tion of the claim is more accurate, but the importance of that belief is that it
leads to a re-examination of the question of whether courts or legislatures are
the better organs for the resolution of conflicting views as to what is protected
by "decisional privacy" or is denied the legislature under "social contract" anal-
ysis.
It must be admitted that it is difficult to assert the historical existence of
an actual contract.55 In fact, if the Constitution were taken to be the social
contract, an argument based on social contract might be used to argue against
judicial activism in privacy cases. As Professor Perry structures that position,
while arguing against it, the Constitution is viewed as a social contract between
the nation and the states and among the branches of the federal government, in
addition to the usual view of the social contract as between the people and the
sovereign or among the people.5 6 As such, the tenth amendment is a clause of
the social contract that is violated by judicial activism where state legislation is
involved.57 Similarly, activist review of congressional and executive actions
violates article III of the social contract.58
54. Lochner, 198 U.S. 45, has not been left out of the historical chain simply because
it is an embarrassment to those who would defend judicial activism. Rather, the case does not
use the social compact language of the earlier opinions nor the privacy language of the modem
opinions. It must be admitted that the language of "liberty" in the fourteenth amendment is akin
to the language of "privacy" in the later cases. There is legitimacy to the claim that modem
privacy cases are a revival of the substantive due process cases, including Lochner. A defense
of judicial activism from the point of view offered here would have to include a defense of the
Court insofar as its authority to issue the Lochner opinion, although clearly there is still room to
argue that the Court was simply wrong in its conclusion that wage and hour legislation is the sort
of legislative act that is beyond its power under the social contract. It may be admitted that the
regulation of relations between people of unequal power would appear to be a proper subject of
state regulation, even if one wishes to argue that consensual acts between competent, equal
adults are beyond that power. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186; Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
55. The United States Constitution might be viewed as the embodiment of the social
contract (but see infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text), but it is not a contract between each
individual and the sovereign or among all individuals. See infra notes 262-73 and
accompanying text. The Mayflower Compact might also seem to be a social contract in that it
bound at least the heads of families to each other, but the Mayflower Compact was only an
agreement to be bound together to regulate local affairs, while acknowledging the continued
supremacy of the British Crown as sovereign. But see M. LESSNOFF, SOCIAL CONTRACT 42(1986) (stating that the Mayflower Compact is a social contract).
56. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
"Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 583-84 (1985). See also infra notes 263-76 and
accompanying text.
57. See Perry, supra note 56, at 584-85.
58. Id. at 585.
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While the Framers of the Constitution may have been affected by social
contract theory,59 the Constitution is not itself the social contract. The social
contract is not a contract among the branches of the sovereign government or
between sovereigns - the states and the federal government.6° The social
contract is among the people or between the people and the sovereign. 61
Although no social contract has ever expressly existed historically, social
contract theory serves as an important explanatory device in political philoso-
phy, and it certainly has had its place in the development of American political
thought.62 The use of social contract as an explanatory device is exemplified by
the work of John Rawls. 63 Professor Rawls examined the concept of justice by
considering not what any actually existing social contract demands, but rather
what rational contractors in an original position establishing a society would
decide was just. The contractors must make their decisions under the "veil of
ignorance," not knowing what positions in society they will occupy. Unable to
identify self-interest, other than in a general sense of interests shared by all, the
contractors will make decisions that treat the interests of all equally and must be
considered just.64
While Rawls uses social contract as a hypothetical method of determining
what is just, he seems also to find additional importance in the idea of contract.
Classical social contract theory is, at bottom, an explanation of the consent of
the governed to the rule of the sovereign. 65 If no real contract exists, in what
sense may citizens be said to have consented to be ruled or to be voluntary par-
ticipants in society? For Professor Rawls the principles of justice that result
from his consideration of hypothetical contract come as close as is possible to a
society being a voluntary scheme, a society in which the obligations of the citi-
zen are self-imposed.66 Contract (the hypothetical contract) not only leads to
justice, but justice leads to contract (the consent to be governed). Rawls' posi-
tion not only uses social contract as an explanatory device, but recognizes that
the element of voluntariness inherent in social contract theory is important to
governmental legitimacy, even if that voluntariness must be found in a society's
principles rather than in its formation.67
Rawls' approach to social contract has found its way into the debate over
the role of judges. Dworkin argued that judges must consider constitutional
59. See infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
60. It may be questionable whether the states and the federal government can both
claim sovereignty, as that term is usually used in social and political philosophy. See infra notes
277-82 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 262-76 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 63-86 and accompanying text.
63. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
64. Id. at 11-19.
65. See infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text.
66. J. RAWLS, supra note 63, at 13.
67. Professor Philip Soper has also examined the question of how to establish the
legitimacy of government without demonstrating actual consent to be governed. He rejects such
bases as tacit consent and concludes that legal obligation to obey the law is found in the good
faith of the ruler in taling into account the interests of the ruled. See P. SOPER, A THEORY OF
LAW (1984).
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theory in resolving hard cases and suggested that Rawls' philosophy must at
least be considered in developing that constitutional theory.68 Taking up
Dworkin's challenge, David Richards derives liberty, self-respect and autonomy
as Rawlsian general goods - goods that would universally be chosen by those
in Rawls' original position and are central to justice.69 Furthermore, he justi-
fies judicial review and supremacy to the extent the judiciary furthers the
attainment of those general goods; that is, judicial review is justified on the
basis of justice,70 and, it appears, by the fact that, according to Richards, con-
tractarian theory is the theory of the Constitution. 1 Thus, for Richards, Rawls'
philosophy establishes a concept of justice and identifies certain goods, includ-
ing the right to decisional privacy, that are judicially enforceable as a part of
the Constitution.
Rawls has clearly made a major contribution to philosophy, and social
contract concepts were important as an explanatory device in making that con-
tribution. Richards may also be seen to have made a contribution in the same
area making similar use of social contract concepts. However, the basis for his
conclusions with regard to judicial review stands apart from his consideration
of what is just and may be attacked separately.
Michael Perry attacks Richards' claim that contractarian theory is the
theory of the Constitution and so constitutionally justifies judicial activism. 72
Professor Perry argues that Richards has never shown that his claim is histori-
cally justified and that, while some or many of the Framers may have agreed
with contractarian philosophy, one may not conclude that the Framers adhered
to a modem Rawlsian social contract theory. 3 Perry recognizes that Richards'
claim might also be established on non-historical grounds by arguing that con-
tractarian philosophy is so compelling that it must be adopted as the theory of
any just constitution. Perry finds it difficult to accept contractarian philosophy,
or any other philosophical theory, as so compelling as to have an exclusive
warrant to define justice. 4
Richards' appeal to justice as a basis for judicial review is also suspect.
As Perry has argued, his claim cannot be that justice demands that judicial
review be a part of our constitutional system. If, instead, his claim is that gov-
ernment should strive to attain a just system, his position is on solid moral
ground. However, justifying judicial review on that basis requires an argument
that the courts are a better instrument for the attainment of justice. That argu-
ment, which is accepted by Perry but does present problems, will be considered
and rejected in discussing Professor Perry's work.75
68. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106-07, 149 (1978).
69. Richards, SexualAutonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study
in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 957, 970-72 (1979).
70. See D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICIsM OF LAW 50 (1977). See also D.
RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 290-92.
71. D. RICHARDS, supra note 70, at 51.
72. Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justkfication,
56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 302-04 (1981).
73. Id. at 302-03.
74. Id. at 303-04.
75. See infira notes 203-27 and accompanying text.
1991] 821
HeinOnline -- 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 821 1991
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
The final basis on which it was suggested that the social contract could be
found to have some form of existence and to be of importance is as a part of
American political history and philosophy. The concept of social contract
seems firmly established both by the influence of social contract theory on the
Framers and certain aspects of the Constitution that may be seen as influenced
by social contract concepts.
The place of social contract in the philosophical underpinnings of the
Constitution is established by Professor Corwin. Professor Corwin traced the
movement of social contract theory into American constitutional theory from
Locke and Hobbes, through the Mayflower Compact and the writings of Hooker
and Otis, as establishing the philosophical background against which the
Constitution was written.76 Indeed, the nation may owe its existence to social
contract theory since "[i]t is axiomatic that a major element in the justificatory
theory for the American Revolution was derived from John Locke's theory of
social contract .... -77 The Framers, too, were influenced by Locke's social
contract, natural rights and natural law theory,78 and Hobbes and Locke have
been said to be "the philosophic forefathers of the American Constitution." 19 It
has even been suggested that the very idea of a written constitution is based on
social contract theory.80
There also appear to be elements of the Constitution itself that embody
aspects of social contract. Professor Henkin notes several aspects of Locke's
and Rousseau's philosophies of social contract blended in the Constitution -
"the original equality and independence of the individual, the sovereignty of the
people (before as well as after government is established), limited government
by consent of the governed for purposes determined by them, and rights
retained under government."81 He also cites to the preamble as reflecting the
same philosophy in stating: "We the People ... do ordain and establish this
Constitution."82
Professor Corwin also found natural law, natural rights, and social con-
tract concepts in the Constitution. He went so far as to conclude his article on
76. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARv. L. Rnv. 149, 383-98 (1928).
77. Dixon, supra note 27, at 46. See also Massey, Federalism and Fundamental
Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS U. 305,314 (1987) ("The American Revolution
had its intellectual underpinnings in Lockean Theory .... ").
78. See Barnett, Are Enumerated ConstitutionalRights the Only Rights We Have? The
Case for Associational Freedom, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 103 (1987) ("the authors
of our Constitution were very much influenced by the Lockean philosophy of 'rights first -
government second"); id. at 104 ("the 'historical Constitution' that judges are called upon to
interpret may be seen most accurately as a product of Lockean philosophy'); Massey, supra note
77, at 314 ("the constitutional framers ... clearly relied upon natural law principles in
formulating constitutional guarantees").
79. G. MCDOWELT, CURBING THE COURTS: THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LIMITS OF
JUDICIAL POWER 49-50 (1988).
80. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 54 ('The idea of a written constitution does
not arise in a historical and cultural vacuum. It flows out of deep currents in Western political
and religious thought, and the moral ideal to which both political and religious thought points is
contractarian.').
81. Henkin, supra note 14, at 1412.
82. Id.
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the "higher law" background of the Constitution with: "[I]n the American writ-
ten Constitution, higher law at last attained a form which made possible the
attribution of an entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanating
from the sovereign people."8 3 Drawing guidance from Corwin, Professor
Dixon states: "[T]he written Constitution can be viewed as a tangible embodi-
ment of a new agreement. In this manner, the social contract concept is
brought down from the rarified stratosphere of natural law-natural rights the-
orizing and made concrete.'
While the flavor of social contract may be found in the general structur-
ing of the national government as one of limited, enumerated powers, the most
obvious inclusion of Lockean philosophy is in the ninth amendment. The
amendment speaks not in terms of social contract, but rather in the language of
natural rights and natural law that accompany Locke's social contract theory.
The ninth amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple."85 That these rights are retained by the people requires that they have
existed prior to the Constitution. While in some circumstances retained rights
might find their prior existence in other sources of positive law, the philosophi-
cal context in which the Constitution and the ninth amendment were written
indicates that the rights retained are inherent or natural rights.86
While the Constitution contains a flavor of social contract, it is important
to note that the Constitution is not the social contract itself.8 7 The social con-
tract is between the individual and other individuals or the sovereign. 88 While
containing social contract aspects in setting out limits on its power and recog-
nizing rights of the people, the Constitution is concerned largely with the
structure of government.
While the Constitution may contain aspects of the social contract, if the
social contract is to be entirely contained in a constitution, it will be only in
what has been referred to as the "unwritten constitution." 89 Even the strong
social contract flavor found in the ninth amendment differs from most of the
83. Corwin, supra note 76, at 409 (emphasis in original).
84. Dixon, supra note 27, at 46 (footnote omitted).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (emphasis added).
86. See, e.g., B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 19 (1955)
("The Ninth Amendment... is a basic statement of the inherent natural rights of the individual....[T]he framers of the Constitution ... carried with them into the work the English concept of
individual liberties, as being inherent in the individual irrespective of the form of government.");
M. GOODMAN, THE NINTH AMENDMENT: HISTORY, INTERPRETATION, AND MEANING 30-33
(1981) (examining the use of "rights" in other documents of the era and finding them to be
natural or inherent rights that cannot be given up under a social contract); Abrams, The Ninth
Amendnent and the Protection of Unenumerated Rights, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 93, 93
(1988) (The ninth amendment protects "rights the Framers believed were inherently held by
people in a free society."). See also supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
87. But see Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 981-82 (1987)
("The Constitution is ... the instrument by which the consent of the governed - the fundamental
requirement of any legitimate government - is transformed into a government complete with the
powers to act and a structure designed to make it act wisely or responsibly.').
88. See infra notes 262-76 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703(1975); Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 211 (1988);
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 1127 (1987); Moore, Do
We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107 (1989).
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Constitution in that it is "about rather than of the Constitution."90 The ninth
amendment recognizes other sources of rights and may be seen as authorizing
resort to those unwritten sources. 91
Without the distinction between the Constitution and social contract, the
only social contract rights would be those recognized by the Framers. Modem
views on natural or inherent rights would play no role.92 But the social con-
tract is the consent of the governed, not simply the consent of our ancestors but
the continuing consent of the people presently governed. 93 Since the parties to
the social contract change and the consent of the new parties continues to be
required for legitimacy, evolution of views as to the content of natural law
speak to the powers denied the government under the social contract.94
II. IDENTIFYING NONTEXTUAL RIGHTS:
MAJORITARIANISM AND COMPETING VALUES
A. The Existence of Nontextual Rights
The argument that individuals enjoy rights beyond those identified in the
Constitution is strong. On purely philosophical grounds, arguments for natural
law and inherent rights that are prior to, and survive the establishment of, gov-
ernments have had a long and distinguished history. 95 The inherent rights
position was certainly widespread at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution,96 and the Framers of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were
influenced by it.97 Its history has continued within our legal culture to the
90. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fiflh, But
What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 239
(1988) (emphasis in original).
91. See Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, supra note 89, at 221.
92. See G. MCDOWELL, supra note 79, at 49-50.
93. See infra notes 242-52 and accompanying text.
94.
[lI]t would be wrong to attempt to reconstruct what natural law meant in the
eighteenth century and pretend that that version of natural law is enshrined in the
ninth amendment.... [While natural law is immutable, people's understanding of
it can improve, and it can be revealed that a previous appreciation of its content
was erroneous.
Arnold, Doing More than Remembering the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI. KENT L. REV. 265,
267 (1988).
95. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. See also J. LOCKE, A TREATISE
OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, ch. II, §§ 5-12, ch. IX,§§ 123-31 (1689).
96. See Corwin, supra note 76, at 383-400.
97. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("rhe
language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution
believed that there are fundamental rights, protected from government infringement, which exist
alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
amendments."). See also supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
Indeed, it has been noted that the ninth amendment was added to the Constitution out of
fear that the enumeration of certain rights in the first eight amendments would be taken to imply
that there were no other rights against the government. See, e.g., Redlich, Are There "Certain
Rights ... Retained by the People" ?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 810-11 (1962).
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present. 98
A lengthy pedigree does not, of course, establish the validity of a philo-
sophical position; and like all philosophical positions, the inherent rights posi-
tion is subject to attack. It is certainly tenable to argue that there are no rights
against the government other than those present in positive law. The argument
is that of the moral skeptic. If there are, in fact, no inherent or natural rights,
then a government can do no wrong. The government would do no wrong, in a
moral sense, even if it were to violate a textual fundamental right, but it would
have violated positive law and positive law would provide a basis for the courts
to declare the action void. Where there is no violation of positive law, the
moral skeptic can find no basis for judicial intervention.
While moral skepticism is a credible theory, it is not the basis on which
the judicial enforcement of nontextual rights is commonly attacked. Judge
Bork, in his inkblot analogy, did not say that there are no unenumerated rights,
but only that it is not the role of the courts to "make up what might be under
the inkblot."99 Indeed, when Professor Barber attacked "Bork's constitutional-
ism" by arguing that it led to the conclusion that the public (through the legisla-
ture) could do no wrong but could at worst be accused of behaving inconsis-
tently with its own chosen principles, 100 Professor McConnell felt compelled to
defend the position against such a charge of moral skepticism. Professor
McConnell noted that "Bork's constitutionalism" depends not on the premise
that the community can do no wrong, but rather on the premise that there are
no institutions in our system better than representative institutions to answer
moral questions.101 The legislature, as well as the courts, may be wrong, so
moral skepticism is not the issue, but where there is disagreement over what is
right and wrong, the legislature's view, under Bork's theory, should control.
The true moral skeptic, one who holds that there are no natural, inherent
or moral rights, and particularly that the individual has no non-positive rights
against the government, will not be swayed by the arguments offered in this
Article. Such a skeptic may denounce the entire line of privacy cases as beyond
the authority of the judiciary. Of course, the moral skeptic cannot bring any
moral outrage to bear against the court and must simply note, dispassionately,
that the courts have exceeded their positive law authority. 02
The moral skeptic must still contend with the ninth amendment's recog-
nition of non-enumerated rights, but the skeptic may maintain that the amend-
98. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
99. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1987, at 22, col. 2 (Testimony of Robert Bork Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee). Judge Bork's view of the ninth amendment was as though it said
there are additional rights and listed them, but an ink blot covered the list. He recognized that
there were unenumerated rights but could not identify them.
100. Barber, The Ninth Amendment: Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?, 64 ClI.-
KENT L. REV. 67, 74-75 (1988).
101. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 89, 95-96 (1988).
102. The argument that the courts have violated positive law may be more difficult to
make. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
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ment is a "philosophical mistake." 103 Nonetheless, the existence of the ninth
amendment within the Constitution indicates the acceptance of a natural rights
philosophy by the founding generation.104 The continued acceptance of the
existence of rights against the government is illustrated by the privacy cases, 10 5
the political climate,106 and the unwillingness of even critics of judicial activism
in the privacy arena to be characterized as moral skeptics.107
A philosophical argument is not won by a comparison of the numbers of
people adhering to the conflicting positions. However, if the issue is the pub-
lic's acceptance of the active role of the courts in privacy cases, the fact that the
skeptic is out of touch with the majority view on the existence of rights against
the government makes it difficult for the moral skeptic to convince that public
that the courts are behaving in an unacceptable manner. There are then politi-
cal, as well as philosophical, reasons why the attack on judicial activism has not
been that of the moral skeptic.
In addition to philosophical argument, the Constitution explicitly recog-
nizes the thesis that there exist non-enumerated rights. The ninth amendment
reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people."108 It is widely
accepted that this language means what it says: the people enjoy rights in addi-
tion to those enumerated in the Constitution.10 9 Even Professor Berger, no
advocate of judicial enforcement of such rights, accepts the ninth amendment
recognition of unenumerated rights.11o Additional textual bases recognizing the
existence of unenumerated rights arguably exist in the article IV privileges and
103. See Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27-28
(1988).
104. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 76, particularly at 152-53. See also Barnett, supra
note 103, at 28-29 (arguing that the Constitution would look significantly different had the
Framers shared or anticipated the moral skeptic view of rights).
105. See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
106. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 138-39 (noting that most American politicians
may be able to accept an argument that the judiciary should defer to the political branches on
unenumerated rights but that they could not accept the moral skepticism argument).
107. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
109. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 86, at 94.
mhe Ninth Amendment plainly and unambiguously determines that it may not be
seriously maintained that if one does not find in the explicit provisions of the Bill
of Rights a constitutional prohibition against Congressional action of one form or
another, the absence of such a provision itself means that the Congressional action
is constitutional.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of
Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 TEX. L. REV. 343, 349 (1981) ("The language of the ninth
amendment is not much help in identifying these unenumerated rights, but it unmistakenly says
that some exist."); Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 231,237 (1975) (footnote omitted):
It seems clear from the language of the ninth amendment that certain rights exist
even though they are not enumerated in the Constitution, that these rights are
retained by the people, and that by express command these unenumerated rights
axe not to be denied or disparaged by any governmental body.
110. See Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9, 20 (1980).
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immunities clause111 and the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities
clause, 112 but these suggested additional bases are not as well accepted. 113
While the language of the ninth amendment seems clear, there have been
attempts to limit the ability to find rights within it.114 Any broad discretion in
the courts to find rights retained by the people under the ninth amendment may
be limited by the argument that those retained must be of similar nature to
those enumerated in the first eight amendments. 1 5 The amendment then is
treated as a sort of ejusdem generis rule.1 6 Even if this approach were to be
accepted, it may not provide strong limitation on the courts. Justice Douglas, in
Griswold, claimed not to have plucked privacy out of the ether, but to have
found it in the penumbra of the enumerated rights. Thus, privacy might be
viewed as being similar to the rights enumerated in the Constitution. A wide
variety of rights, classified as privacy interests, could then be protected even if
the ninth amendment were so limited.117 If, on the other hand, ninth amend-
ment rights are required to be so closely tied to the enumerated rights as to
flow directly from them, the enumerated rights disparage the existence of other
rights retained by the people, in violation of the terms of the amendment." 8
It has also been suggested that the ninth amendment may not be a state-
ment of the existence of legal rights but merely a statement of "constitutional
aspiration," which, like the preamble to the Constitution, would be unenforce-
able. 119 This view would appear similar to Professor Berger's view that what-
ever ninth amendment rights may exist, they are not judicially enforceable
because they do not arise under the Constitution. 20 However, as various com-
mentators have noted, to argue that ninth amendment rights are not judicially
enforceable, while enumerated rights are, is to disparage the retained rights,
despite the amendment's command that such rights not be disparaged.' 2'
Another limiting reading of the ninth amendment is the theory that it
simply protects, against federal interference, the states' ability to grant rights to
their citizens. 22 The rights protected by the ninth amendment would then be
111. See Richards, Interpretation and Historiography, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 489, 544(1985).
112. Huhn, Mill's Theory of Liberty in Constitutional Interpretation, 22 AKRON L.
REV. 133, 147-48 (1988).
113. With regard to the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause, see the
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16WaIL) 36. But cf. M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE
(1986) (arguing for the application of the clause to invalidate state infringements of rights).
114. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
115. See Redlich, supra note 97, at 810, 812.
116. See Laycock, supra note 109, at 369.
117. There would be disagreement over whether privacy rights are sufficiently similar,
but the relativity of "similarity" allows the advocate of the enforcement of privacy rights to accept
the requirement of similarity and, with Justice Douglas, find sufficient similarity.
118. See Laycock, supra note 109, at 368; Rapaczynski, The Ninth Amendment and the
Unwritten Constitution: The Problems of Constitutional Interpretation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
177, 178 (1988).
119. Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, supra note 89, at 213.
120. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 390 (1977); Berger, supra note 110, at
9.
121. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 109, at 349; Massey, supra note 77, at 318;
Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the "Jurisprudence of Original Intention," 74 GEO. LJ.
1719, 1729 (1986).
122. See Sager, supra note 90, at 243-45.
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positive law rights, rather than natural law, inherent rights. A similar
approach is to argue that the ninth amendment is simply a limitation on federal
powers, rather than an affirmance of individual rights. 23 Given that the first
eight amendments specifically recognize individual rights against the federal
government'24 and the tenth amendment's clear role as a limitation on federal
powers, these readings of the ninth amendment are, at best, strained.125
There are, then, both solid philosophical arguments for, and constitu-
tional recognition of, the existence of unenumerated rights. The philosophical
argument may have broader scope than the constitutional argument. The con-
stitutional acceptance of unenumerated rights might be argued to be limited to
those rights the Framers either accepted or would have accepted. As philoso-
phy advances and the concepts of inherent rights and social contract change, any
rights that rest on a philosophical foundation may also change.126 It is the idea
of social contract and the need for continuing consent to be governed that is
central to this Article.1 27 Thus, the constitutional argument is intended only as
an additional indication of the important place unenumerated, inherent rights
have in our history and current society.
The real problem seems not to be with the existence of unenumerated
rights, but rather with the question of what branch of the government should
identify those rights. Justice Iredell, in his Calder v. Bull opinion, did not rest
on a denial of the concept of natural justice, but rather on the view that should a
judge disagree with the legislature on a question of natural justice, it is the leg-
islature, as the branch responsible to the people, whose view should control.12 8
The same concern has been expressed by the Court in recent history. Justice
White, writing for the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, declined to take an
expansive view of the Court's authority to find fundamental rights, because in
doing so the Court would be furthering its authority to govern, without having
been given express constitutional authority to do So.1 2 9
While Justice White may be correct in noting that there is no express
constitutional authorization given the Court to find fundamental rights,130 nei-
ther is there any express constitutional rule limiting judicial review to clear
cases.' 3' Indeed, Professor Tribe argues that to counsel caution in the identifi-
cation of unenumerated rights and suggest that the Court should limit itself to
clear cases is to disparage the unenumerated, and hence less clear, rights re-
tained by the people 32
123. See Paust, supra note 109, at 239-48.
124. The fact that the Bill of Rights, when adopted, applied only to the federal
government raises the question whether the ninth amendment applies to the states. That issue is
discussed, infra, at notes 307-17 and accompanying text.
125. See Sager, supra note 90, at 243-51; Paust, supra note 109, at 239-48.
126. See supra notes 5 & 94 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
128. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
129. 478 U.S. at 194-95.
130. This view may, on the other hand, be seen as disparaging the unenumerated rights
in comparison to the judicially enforceable enumerated rights.
131. R. DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 141.
132. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 105 (1987).
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The Constitution does not resolve whether the legislature or judiciary
should decide privacy issues. The Court is not explicitly granted such power
and Professor Tribe must look to the effect of its denial to argue for its exis-
tence. Neither is the Court explicitly denied such authority, and Justice White
must assume that the Court may only act where such explicit authority is
granted in order to deny such authority. 133
Lacking constitutional resolution, the issue must be resolved on other,
extra-constitutional grounds.134 As Professor Kay argues, we must turn to
"nonlegal criteria, to our basic political, moral, or aesthetic convictions."' 35 It
is to these criteria that critics of the privacy cases turn for their arguments
against judicial activism, 36 also thereby confessing the lack of constitutional
resolution. It is also to these convictions that the advocate for the judicial
recognition of privacy rights must turn to justify that active judicial role.137
B. The Argument From Democracy
The critics of judicial activism and the right to privacy have turned to the
value of democracy to justify their position. The argument from democracy
does not rest on the position that individuals can have no rights against the gov-
ernment, but rather on the claim that the courts are not the institution to iden-
tify those rights.138 Where rights against the government are not textually
based, they turn, at least to some degree, on personal view. The argument
from democracy asserts that there is impropriety in allowing the personal views
of the judges to control the personal views of legislators whom the people have
elected to make society's policy choices.139 Our system is a democratic system,
and "majority rule has been considered the keystone of a democratic political
system....,140
The argument from democracy has a long history. It may be found in
Justice Iredell's opinion in Calder v. Bull.141 It is mixed with federalism con-
133. Professor Berger argues that privacy cases do not arise under the Constitution and,
therefore, are not judicially enforceable. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. With
regard to federal statutes, however, such cases may be seen to arise under laws of the United
States, satisfying article III jurisdiction requirements. With regard to state statutes, if the
Supreme Court's authority is to be constitutionally based, it must be shown that the statute raises
a federal constitutional or statutory issue. But see infra notes 307-17 and accompanying text.
134. As Professor Soper argues, theories of judicial review are normative theories and
depend for their acceptance on their underlying political theories. P. SOPER, supra note 67, at
115.
135. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L. 187, 193 (1981). See also Perry,
supra note 56, at 577. Cf. Perry, Interpreting the Constitution, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1157,
1217 ("There is a deep and ineradicable tension in the American political tradition between the
value of electorally accountable policymaking and certain other values or ideals.").
136. See infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 189-241 and accompanying text.
138. See Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV.
417,419-20 (1981); R. DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 138.
139. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 138, at 417; Sadurski, Conventional Morality and
Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L. REV. 339,339 (1987).
140. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLrlCAL PROCEss 4
(1980).
141. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399 ("If the legislature pursue the authority delegated to them,
their acts are valid.... [Tihey exercise the discretion vested in them by the people, to whom
alone they are responsible for the faithful discharge of their trust....').
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cems in the Slaughterhouse Cases,142 and it may be seen in the words of Justice
Holmes, stating that the concept of "liberty ... is perverted when it is held to
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion... "143 Justice White's dis-
sent, joined by Justice Rehnquist, in Roe v. Wade,144 expresses clear concern
over the Court "imposing [its] priorities on the people and legislatures...."145
The argument is well articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist. He argues
that a judiciary exercising nontextual review becomes a fortunately situated
small group with "a roving commission to second-guess Congress, state legisla-
tures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning what is best for
the country."146 He finds no justification, for a third legislative branch and
argues that even if there were a justification, that branch should at least be
elected by and responsible to the people. 47 Arguments based on nontextual
rights and a "living Constitution" are "genuinely corrosive of the fundamental
values of our democratic society."'148
Those who have argued against the imposition of the views of the judi-
ciary to supplant those of the people or the legislature have accepted such inter-
vention under some circumstances. Justice Iredell's deference to the legislature
stood so long as the legislature did not transgress the boundaries of its author-
ity. 14 9 Similarly, the Slaughterhouse Court did find some privileges and
immunities protected by the Constitution against the will of the state legisla-
tures.150 Justice Holmes' view in Lochner was limited to cases in which the
statute at issue did not infringe on fundamental rights as understood by our
traditions and law,' 5' and Justice White's unwillingness to overturn the abortion
statutes at issue in Roe v. Wade was because the Court was, in his view, without
constitutional warrant to do so.15 2 Lastly, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern
over an activist judiciary's corrosive effect on democratic values arises only
when the courts abandon the tie between their authority to declare laws uncon-
stitutional and the language of the Constitution. 53
The interplay between the concept of democracy and constitutional limi-
tations is explained by Judge Bork in discussing the privacy cases. Judge Bork
believes our major freedom to be the freedom "to choose to have a public
morality" and the liberty to make laws to be the liberty that constitutes us as a
free people. 54 Judge Bork would allow the will of the legislature to be over-
turned in certain instances. For Judge Bork those instances are defined by the
Constitution.
142. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78.
143. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
144. 410 U.S. 113.
145. Id. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
146. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 698
(1976).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 706.
149. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399.
150. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
151. 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
152. 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J., dissenting).
153. See Rehnquist, supra note 146, at 698.
154. R. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9 (1984).
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Judge Bork's view of our society is not of a purely democratic society,
but rather as a "Madisonian system." In such a system, there are areas where
the majority has complete control and other areas in which the Constitution
calls for the protection of the rights of political minorities. 155 His appeal is not,
then, to pure democracy, but to a modified form of democracy. When used to
criticize judicial activism and the privacy decisions, it is a form of the argument
from democracy. The same is true of the other invocations of democracy.
While the Constitution or traditional fundamental rights may provide the courts
a basis for interfering with the will of the legislature and the people, the claim
of lack of authority in the courts when such a basis is lacking is an appeal to the
value of democracy.
The argument from democracy is not itself a constitutional argument.156
It is, instead, an argument that, where there is no express constitutional denial
of a power to the legislature, democracy dictates that the view of the
legislature, as expressing the view of the people as to what does or does not
infringe on liberty or privacy is superior to the view of the judiciary. Since it
is an extra-constitutional appeal to values, its strength depends on the strength
of the value to which it appeals.
Our society seems firmly committed to the value of democracy. While it
may be argued that the Constitution does not establish a democratic system, at
least democracy understood so as to preclude nontextual judicial review, 157
certain aspects of the Constitution do reflect an acceptance of the value of
democracy. Placement of the lawmaking authority in a legislature at least one
house of which was to be elected by the people, is one such democratic ele-
ment. 158 Naming as electors of members of the House of Representatives those
in each state who were electors for the most numerous branch of the state's
legislature is another such element. 159 That brought as many people as the
states recognized as electors into an electoral role in the national government,
assuring a large, democratic participation. 160 The guaranty to each state of a
republican form of government presents a similar element of democracy.' 6'
On the other hand, in other areas the Framers' Constitution showed a
lack of commitment to democracy. Certainly the continued acceptance of slav-
ery and the failure to include women within the electorate limited popular par-
ticipation in the government. If the will of the majority was to control, at least
155. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 2-
3 (1971).
156. A constitutional argument can certainly be made for representative government as
opposed to a more pure form of democracy. However, such an argument loses the evocative
power of the word "democracy." It is also open to arguments that a constitutional and
philosophical commitment to representative government leaves open the form that representative
government is to take. See infra note 185 and accompanying text. While the response, when
the appeal is to democracy, is that a form including judicial review is not just different but is also
less democratic (see infra note 186 and accompanying text), it is not as clear that a government
with judicial review is less a representative government, at least given the limited representation
provided by the original Consitution.
157. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 141; Barber, supra note 100, at 84.
158. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-3.
159. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
160. But see infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
161. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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in the House of Representatives, it was only to be the will of white males. 162
Even for the white male population, democratic participation was restricted.
While the House of Representatives would be popularly elected, the senators
from each state were to be chosen by the state legislatures.163 Half the lawmak-
ing authority was then to be exercised by individuals chosen not by the common
people but by those of rank and position.
These anti-democratic elements in the Constitution reflect anti-demo-
cratic sentiments among the Framers. At the Federal Convention, Edmund
Randolph argued that the chief danger to the state governments "arises from the
democratic parts of our constitutions."'164 Randolph also spoke of the evils
under which the United States labored at the time, and said that "in tracing these
evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of
democracy." 65 In discussing the Senate, Randolph hoped it would act as a
check on the House "to restrain, if possible, the fury of democracy,"166 and
objected to election of Senators by even the state legislatures because that pro-
cedure would not provide a sufficient check. 67 His procedure, appointment of
Senators by the House, would have further removed the Senate from the people.
Others shared Randolph's views. Roger Sherman favored election of the
national legislature by the state legislatures rather than by the people, saying
"[tihe people ... should have as little to do as may be about the government."'168
Elbridge Gerry immediately agreed, noting that "[t]he evils we experience flow
from the excess of democracy." 69 Acting as a moderating influence, George
Mason argued for election of the larger house by the people. "He admitted that
we had been too democratic but was afraid we [should] incautiously run into the
opposite extreme." 170 Alexander Hamilton, while not speaking so strongly
against democracy at the Federal Convention, later came to call democracy "the
real disease" of our nation.'71 Indeed, it has been argued that the Federalists,
while employing the rhetoric of democracy, were not that strongly committed
to democracy. 172
While the dedication of the Framers to democracy might then be some-
what suspect, our history after the framing and ratification of the Constitution
shows some increase in society's acceptance of democracy as an important
value. Most notable are several amendments to the Constitution. The seven-
162. The exclusion of "Indians not taxed" from the basis for apportioning representation
in the House (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (later changed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2))
may also signal acceptance of denying participation to Indians.
163. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (later changed by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII).
164. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 26 (M. Ferrand ed. 1966)(McHenry's notes of May 29, 1787).
165. Id. at51 (Madison's notes of May 31, 1787).
166. Id. at 58 (Pierce's notes of May 31, 1787).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 48 (Madison's notes of May 31, 1787).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 49.
171. G. STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN
GOVENMENT 40 (1977).
172. See Miller, supra note 12. Miller's position may require a restrictive view as to
what counts as democracy. If Hamilton's and Madison's lack of commitment was limited to
direct, participational democracy, it would not mean a lack of commitment to the representational
democracy on which the argument from democracy is based.
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teenth amendment provided for the direct election of the Senate by the people
of the various states. 173 Rather than remaining as a check on democracy, the
Senate joined the House of Representatives as a democratic element in national
government. In addition, the electorate was expanded by the fifteenth,174 nine-
teenth' 75 and twenty-sixth 76 amendments, showing an increasing commitment
to popular participation in government and to placing the lawmaking power in
a more fully representative body.
Even if one accepts the importance of the value of democracy both his-
torically and as a current societal value, the question remains as to what form
of government and judicial role are entailed by a commitment to democracy.
Professor Perry recognizes the "axiomatic or canonical status" of "electorally
accountable policymaking" in our political-legal culture,177 though he questions
the priority of that value in relation to other values.178 However, he character-
izes it as a false assumption to conclude that a particular concept of democracy
is axiomatic in- our political tradition.1l 9 Perry suggests that our culture's aspi-
ration to the achievement of justice is sufficiently central to lead to the adoption
of a form of democracy in which the judiciary may exercise non-textual
review.1 80
One may question whether a commitment to democracy is equivalent to a
commitment to legislative supremacy. Scholars as varied as Professor Perry
and Justice Scalia seem to accept the legitimacy of a court appealing to conven-
tional morality to overrule the will of the legislature.181 Under some circum-
stances the basis for the appeal may be the claim that the legislature is out of
step with the moral consensus; that is, the legislature has failed to act as a repre-
sentative body and deference to the legislature would not further democracy.
In other cases the legislature may be in step with the majority, but the major-
ity's current moral stance has deviated from its historical position. In either
173. US. CONST. amend. XVII.
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting the denial of the right to vote on account of
race, color or previous condition of servitude).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting the denial of the right to vote on the basis
of sex).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (prohibiting denying citizens 18 years old or older the
right to vote on account of age).
177. Perry, supra note 135, at 1217.
178. Id. at 1218. See also infra note 185 and accompanying text.
179. Id. at 1219; Perry, supra note 56, at 575.
180. See infra notes 207-19 and accompanying text. Perry also questions how great a
departure from democracy it is to permit non-textual review, noting both political checks on the
courts and the lack of popular participation in the legislative process. Perry, supra note 29, at
467-68. Elsewhere, however, Perry notes that the responsiveness of the Court to the polity is
not immediate and that immediacy does count in analyzing how democratic an institution is.
Perry, supra note 56, at 581.
181. See Perry, supra note 29, at 417; Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the
Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689,
731 (1976); AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INsTrrUTE, AN IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: FACT OR MYTH?
36 (1979) (comment of then Professor Scalia) ("I am not saying the Court always has to go
along with the consensus of the day. The Court may find that the traditional consensus of the
society is against the current consensus. If that is the case, then the Court overrides the present
beliefs of society on the basis of its historical beliefs. I can understand that.").
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case, it is questionable whether a court's substitution of its view in place of the
legislature's doesn't run counter to the value of democracy.182
Where the court claims that the legislature has failed to follow the moral
consensus, the claim is that the court is in fact furthering democracy. It substi-
tutes not its own, but the majority's view in place of that of the legislature.
This argument, however, assumes that the courts can identify a moral consensus
that conflicts with the statute. It may be questioned whether or not there is any
such popular consensus to discover in a situation in which there is conflict. 183
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the courts are in a position superior to
the legislature to identify that consensus. 84 Courts' abilities are especially sus-
pect when the issue is the nature of the current consensus. The only basis for a
claim of judicial superiority cannot be in sampling current view but in the
scholarly examination of society's historic moral view. On that analysis, how-
ever, the argument collapses into the argument that the present moral consensus
is in conflict with the historic moral view.
The argument that the courts may invalidate a law when it conflicts with
the traditional or historic moral view of society still runs counter to the value
of democracy. Just because it is a past majority that is appealed to does not
overcome the fact that it is the current majority's view that is being invalidated.
That is not to say that such an approach is unacceptable, but only to note that it
too must overcome the argument from democracy. Its attempt to do so by
appealing to the value of tradition, consistency, or even the Framers' intent to
overcome the value of democracy leaves open the possibility of still other
values serving as a basis to invalidate other laws not in conflict with the tradi-
tional moral view.
Professor Perry questioned whether our commitment to democracy
commits us to legislative supremacy. Arguments based on past moral view
answer that question by limiting the commitment to a democracy that maintains
tradition, as Perry's democracy would maintain justice. Perry's question, how-
ever, may be better viewed as questioning whether there might be other values,
justice in his view,185 that compete with democracy in determining our society's
choice of government and the scope of judicial review.
Any deviation from legislative supremacy and the placement of policy-
making authority in the judiciary is more than simply the selection of an alter-
native form of democracy. It is the selection of a less democratic system. That
selection may be justified by appeal to another value, but that value will conflict
with and must be balanced against democracy. Perry has found a strong value
182. A commitment to pure democracy might require that, even in these cases, the
remedy be at the polls. While the limited democracy theories may have to explain the
willingness to impose such a limit, the position of this Article requires that the decision be
removed from the people, as well as from the legislature.
183. See Ely, The Supreme Court 1977 Term -Forward: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 41 (1978).
184. This is, of course, the central issue in the criticism of the privacy decisions. The
claim that the decisions are anti-democratic rests on the assumption that any consensus that exists
is found in the position of the legislature and that the courts, in invalidating a statute on non-
textual grounds, are interfering with the democratic process.
185. See infra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
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in justice, a value which is for him superior to democracy.18 6 While other val-
ues may also be offered as sufficiently important to act as limitations on democ-
racy,187 our cultural commitment to democracy must be recognized as a strong
value to be limited only by similarly strong values.18
C. Values to Counter the Commitment to Democracy
Professor Dworkin argues that the value of democracy may be limited by
other values.189 Dworkin notes that the argument for judicial "passivism" by
appeal to fairness rests on two claims. The first is that for a political system to
be fair, the majority must be constrained only by principles endorsed or at least
accepted by the majority at the moment when the constraint is urged on that
majority.190 Secondly, fairness, so understood, must be taken to be a singularly
important value and to be preferred to justice when the two conflict.191
Dworkin argues that political fairness does not require adherence to such a
strict form of majoritarianism, 192 and on this point he is joined by even such
majoritarians as Professor Bork.193 Professor Dworkin also finds such strength
in the value of justice that democracy does not necessarily ride roughshod over
justice.194
If fault is to be found in Professor Dworkin's conclusion, it is in the fail-
ure to include values other than justice as values that may balance or counter an
appeal to democracy. Professor Nagel has argued more broadly that a variety
of rights are sufficiently important to provide limitations on the power of the
majority. 195
Various commentators, most notably Professors Ely, Perry and Richards,
have suggested nontextual values that might properly serve as the basis for
186. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 10
(1982) ("If I were unable to defend constitutional policymaking by the judiciary as consistent
with the principle of electorally accountable policymaking, then, given my commitment to
constitutional policymaking by the judiciary, I would have to question the axiomatic character of
the principle of electorally accountable policymaking.").
187. See infra notes 189-241 & 292-317 and accompanying text.
188. Once again (see supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text), the fact that our society is
strongly committed to democracy does not add strength to a purely jurisprudential argument that
consent is more important than democracy. However, since society is at least as strongly
committed to government by consent (see supra notes 166-72 & infra notes 242-47 and
accompanying text) as it is to democracy, the argument for judicial activism, which flows from
consent, should be as strong as the argument for legislative supremacy, flowing from
democracy. This is not a jurisprudential point, but a call to recognize the conclusion to which
our actually held values lead.
189. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 376-77 (1986).
190. Id. at 376.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 377.
193. Bork, supra note 155, at 2-3 (discussing "tyranny of the majority" a position that
must recognize that some areas, for Professor Bork those areas set aside by the Constitution, are
beyond the control of the majority).
194. R. DWORKIN, supra note 189, at 377. See also infra notes 207-19 and
accompanying text.
195. Nagel, The Supreme Court and Political Philosophy, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 519, 520
(1981). For Nagel, "equal liberty" is such a value or right, but he leaves open the possibility of
appeal to other values.
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declaring a statute invalid.196 Before turning to the examination of the value of
adherence to the social contract and consent of the governed as another such
value, it would be useful to examine the efforts of Ely, Perry and Richards as
examples of the appeal to alternative values in refusing to defer to the legisla-
ture's policy determinations.
John Hart Ely, in his influential book, Democracy and Distrust, offers a
justification for noninterpretive review, and thus a more active role for the
courts, in both first amendment and equal protection cases. 197 He argues that
his grant of authority to judges in these areas is consistent with our societal
commitment to democracy, because the judges are not to select and protect
substantive values but are instead to protect process.198 Both the first amend-
ment and the equal protection clause protect participation in the political pro-
cess, and the courts may further, in a noninterpretive way, the value of par-
ticipation. When a group has been underrepresented in, or shut out of, the
political process, the representative system cannot be trusted to protect the
interests of the nonparticipating group and the court must take an expanded
role.199
Professor Ely's approach does not justify judicial activism in the privacy
cases, since he limits its application to first amendment and equal protection
cases. That limitation has been criticized by Perry and Dworkin as involving
the judge in the same sort of substantive decisionmaking Professor Ely would
disallow in the privacy arena.20= Perry argues that Ely is inconsistent in that
any justification of noninterpretive review in first amendment and equal pro-
tection cases will also justify noninterpretive review in substantive due process
cases, because the two forms of noninterpretive review are "the same ani-
mal."201 Both call for judges to look not to the value judgments of the Framers
but to the values of the individual judges.202 Furthermore, in Perry's view,
there is no basis for the belief that elected officials are more trustworthy in
their resolution of disputes involving nonparticipational values than in resolving
disputes involving participational values.2"3 Dworkin also criticizes Ely's dis-
tinction in that both types of cases involve judges in the same sort of decision-
making.204
Perry and Dworkin may be correct in arguing that the decisions in both
the nonparticipational and participational values cases are of the same variety
and that elected officials are not to be trusted more in one area than in the
other. Nonetheless, there is a distinction between the two types of cases that
makes Ely's position consistent. The most powerful argument for deference to
196. See infra notes 197-239 and accompanying text.
197. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST (1980).
198. Id. at 102.
199. Id. at 103.
200. See infra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
201. Perry, supra note 72, at 318; M. PERRY, supra note 186, at 119.
202. Perry, supra note 72, at 318-19. Perry does note that the individual values of thejudge are rooted in the culture, so the determination will not be idiosyncratic (id. at 319), but for
him the two types of review remain the same.
203. M. PERRY, supra note 186, at 121.
204. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470 (1981).
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legislatively expressed values over those of the judges has been the argument
from democracy. Professor Ely's justification for departing from that defer-
ence in first amendment and equal protection cases is that that departure may be
necessary to further democratic, participational values. Ely accepts the pri-
macy of democracy as a normative value and argues that democracy itself
requires the imposition of the values of the judiciary in disputes over participa-
tion. In the privacy cases it is not in the name of democracy that the courts
invalidate a statute, but in the furtherance of some other value.2 5 Ely may then
stand on his distinction. His approach is limited to the cases he delineates. In
criticizing, rather than simply distinguishing, the privacy cases, however, Ely
makes the mistake of assuming that democracy is the only value to be consid-
ered in determining where decisionmaking authority should lie.2w
Professor Perry finds his justification for nontextual review in the exis-
tence of another value that, like democracy, is central to our society. Perry
examines our history and finds a "religious," in the sense of a binding vision,
commitment to the realization of "higher law."'207 He recognizes a commitment
to representative government and democratic ideals, but argues that that is not
the only constitutive aspiration of our political tradition. Also central to our
aspirations is the achievement of justice.208 Perry has identified justice as
another value that history and present commitment show has sufficient strength
to serve as a balance to our commitment to democracy. The step that remains
for Perry is to demonstrate how that commitment to justice leads to the conclu-
sion that the judiciary is justified in exercising nontextual review to overturn
decisions arrived at through the democratic process.
Perry takes that remaining step to noninterpretive review through what
he styles as a functional argument.209 The judiciary is justified in exercising
non-textual review if such review furthers our commitment to justice more
than it damages the democracy to which we are also committed, that is, if it
allows us to keep faith with both traditions.210 Perry is willing to conclude that
the balance tips in favor of nontextual judicial review.
Perry minimizes the negative effect on democracy. He recognizes that
the judge must make an individual determination as to the contours of conven-
tional moral culture, but he notes that it is extremely unlikely that an uncon-
ventional individual would sit on the Supreme Court.21' The views of the
Justices are then likely to reasonably reflect those of society. If the view of the
Justice does conflict with that of society and the Justice recognizes that conflict,
the duty of the Justice is to defer to society's morality.212 If a sufficient num-
ber of Justices fail to give deference to the public morality, when a conflict has
become obvious, Perry argues that history shows that the polity rather than the
205. Perry tries to include these other values, for him justice, within the concept of
democracy, but they are better viewed as being balanced against democracy. See supra notes
185-86 and accompanying text & infra notes 207-19 and accompanying text.
206. See P. SOPER, supra note 67, at 182 n.10.
207. M. PERRY, supra note 186, at 97.
208. See Perry, supra note 56, at 577; Perry, supra note 135, at 1220.
209. M. PERRY, supra note 186, at 101.
210. Id.
211. Perry, supra note 181, at 730.
212. Id.
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Court will prevail. 213 Thus, democracy, even if delayed, prevails, and the cost
of the delay may be made up for by the gain in justice by allowing noninter-
pretive review.214
With regard to the attainment of justice through nontextual review, Perry
approves of the Court's performance, at least during the modem era.215 He
recognizes that even one who agrees with him on the performance of the mod-
em Court might be given pause to reconsider, if the longer term performance
of the Court were the basis for testing the value of nontextual review. If the
Dred Scott216 and Lochner217 decisions are taken into consideration, the Court's
performance is less admirable. Perry's response is to limit consideration to the
modem era. The justification for the current and future practice of judicial
review is the current or predicted future performance of the Court. The best
evidence for future performance is performance in the recent, rather than the
distant, past.218 While he admits that the Court is fallible and might serve to
retard rather than further moral growth,219 the balance for Perry cuts in favor
of nontextual review.
Perry's argument might be attacked both on the grounds that it underes-
timates the effect of nontextual review on democracy and that its tendency to
further justice is less than Perry takes it to be. To be faithful to the ideal of
democracy, Perry requires that the Justice, in examining a statute, be guided
not by his or her own moral vision but by conventional morality. That task,
however, is made more difficult by the tendency to confuse justice with one's
own perception of justice.220 This difficulty is even greater if the Court is to
take any lead in the development of morality. If morality is to move forward
toward right answers221 and the Court is to play a prophetic role,222 the task
becomes even more difficult. If it is easy to confuse one's own vision of cur-
rent morality with actual current morality, it must be even more likely that one
will confuse one's view as to the direction morality should be taking with the
direction it is actually taking. This is especially so in the context of rapidly
changing moral vision most likely to call for, and make controversial, nontex-
tual review. 2 3
The other attack on Perry's approach is to question the degree to which
the courts have furthered justice. To agree with Perry one must agree both that
213. Perry, supra note 56, at 580.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., id. at 578 ("In the modem period ... the Court's record in service of
individual rights is admirable."). See also R. DWORKIN, supra note 189, at 356 ("The United
States is a more just society than it would have been had its constitutional rights been left to the
conscience of majoritarian institutions.").
216. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
217. 198 U.S. 45.
218. See Perry, supra note 56, at 579; Perry, supra note 135, at 1222.
219. M. PERRY, supra note 186, at 115.
220. See G. MCDOWELL, supra note 79, at 21 (discussing Dworkin's similar require-
ment that a judge distinguish morality from his or her own perceptions of morality).
221. See M. PERRY, supra note 186, at 113.
222. See Perry, supra note 135, at 1195.
223. See Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 981, 1037 (1979).
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the Court has contributed to justice in the recent past and that the more distant
past is either irrelevant or outweighed by the recent past. While any article
attempting to justify the privacy decisions would conclude, with Perry, that the
recent Court has furthered justice, not all would agree. The legislatures that
passed the statutes at issue, and presumably the public they represented, seem-
ingly had a different view of justice -
Perry's concentration on the record of the Warren Court may also be "a
careful underestimation of past Supreme Court error. '2 5 Dred Scott and
Lochner do not stand alone as cases in which justice was not furthered. They
may be the clearest examples of nontextual review impeding moral progress
and justice, but there are certainly other cases in which the Court either
impeded or failed to further what most would now agree is just. Korematsu v.
United States226 is a more recent dramatic example of the Court failing to pro-
vide moral leadership and further justice and in a situation that did not even
require resort to nontextual review. Furthermore, reliance on the recent past
makes little sense when the personnel of the Court has changed. One who, like
Perry, applauds the performance of the Court in its past employment of nontex-
tual review might take pause in considering the employment of such review by
the current Court or an even more conservative future Court.
Richards, too, bases his justification of the privacy cases on the existence
of important values that may serve to counter democracy-based arguments.
While Richards cites various values or principles, the most important seems to
be his principle of equal liberty and basic opportunity, under which each indi-
vidual is given "the greatest equal liberty and basic opportunity compatible with
a like liberty and basic opportunity for all. '2 7 Richards also lists a second
important principle that limits the right of the government to violate the first
principle. His principle of justified inequality requires that inequalities be
"allowed only if those inequalities are a necessary incentive to elicit the exercise
of superior capacities and only if the exercise of those capabilities advances the
interests of typical people in all standard classes ... more than equality
would...."=
Richards also relies on the values of autonomy and equal concern and
respect as bases for the establishment of privacy rights,229 but the right to pri-
vacy, as well as those of autonomy and equal concern and respect, may be
deriveable from the right to equal liberty and basic opportunity. For Richards,
the "elaboration of an independent constitutional right to privacy in Griswold et
al. represents an implementation of underlying moral values of treating persons
as equals...."2 0
224. Where the statute was promulgated in the distant past, it may say little about the
current view of the legislature or people with regard to justice.
225. Tepker, Judicial Review and Moral Progress: Searching for the Better Angels of
Our Nature, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 276 (1984).
226. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
227. D. RICHARDS, supra note 70, at 48.
228. Id. at 49. See also D. RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 245.
229. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 69, at 969, 999.
230. Richards, Human Rights as the Unwritten Constitution: The Problem of Change
and Stability in Constitutional Interpretation, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 295, 302 (1979).
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Even taking these rights and principles as basic, the problem of justifying
the invalidation of statutes on privacy right grounds remains. While admitting
that there is no textual root for the right of privacy,231 Richards finds such a
right to be constitutionally established. He says that for a contractarian, like
himself, it is the principles of justice, rather than an acceptance of the ultimate
good of majority rule or neutral principles, that provide the starting premises
for constitutional democracy.232 One form of constitution that would be justi-
fied by these premises is one like the Constitution of the United States which he
finds to embody the principle of greatest equal liberty.233 Richards' approach
seems to be that rational contractors in Rawls' original position would select a
constitution embodying such a principle, therefore the delegates to the Federal
Convention of 1787 must have done so.234 Hence, the principle of equal liberty
and basic opportunity is to be found, by inference, within our Constitution.
Once Richards has established his principles as within the Constitution, he
seems to view it as a short step to the justification of the judicial invalidation of
statutes on right of privacy grounds. He suggests that there be a division of
labor among the branches of the government based on the differing competen-
cies of those branches. Application of the principle of equal liberty and basic
opportunity is felt to be well within the judiciary's competence, while applying
the principle of justified inequality, which requires balancing social and eco-
nomic facts and theories, is left to the legislature.235
It is not clear, however, that Richards' division of labor is along a well-
defined line. Since the principle of justified inequality is what allows the legis-
lature to infringe upon the principle of equal liberty and basic opportunity,
there may well be situations in which an equal liberty challenge to a statute is
met with a justified inequality defense. The courts will then have two choices.
They may either decide that the legislative view on justified inequality should
control or they may make their own assessment of the justification for the
inequality. The choice is the same as the choice between accepting the argu-
ment from democracy or exercising some form of nontextual policy or philo-
sophical review. The change in the language in which the basic problem is
phrased does not serve in itself to justify the activist role for the judiciary.
Richards' approach also faces a problem in what appears to be his view
that the United States Constitution embodies his principles. He asserts that those
who fail to appreciate the theoretical usefulness of contractarian theory in this
area underestimate the historical importance of contractarian thinking in the
minds of the Framers. 236 In his view "[c]ontractarian theory ... is the theory of
the Constitution .... 237 However, while social contract theory was influential
231. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 18, at 232.
232. D. RICHARDS, supra note 70, at 49-50. Thus, for Richards, as for Perry, justice
is a value more basic than democracy.
233. Id. at 50.
234. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text.
235. See D. RICHARDS, supra note 70, at 54-55.
236. Id. at 51.
237. Id. Richards also argues that it is the moral theory, rather than a set of specific
moral rights, that is encompassed within the Constitution. Thus, there is no reason to limit the
finding of moral rights to those regarded by the Framers as fundamental.
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among the Framers 238 that theory was not the Rawlsian social contract theory
on which Richards' principles are based.239 Richards fails to establish that his
principles are constitutional principles, which is not to say that they are unim-
portant as extra-constitutional values, and fails to justify judicial enforcement of
those principles.
The difficulty with the approaches to justifying judicial activism in pri-
vacy cases examined thus far is that they are based on the correctness of results.
Perry bases his theory on the importance of justice even at the expense of
democracy. Even accepting that view, however, it is not clear that the courts
are better at achieving justice. If the justification depends on the result, and the
departure from democracy does not assure the attainment of the result, the
departure from democracy may not be justified.
For Richards, the result also provides the justification, but the result is
the equal liberty found within the Constitution. It is debatable whether such a
principle is found within the Constitution, and the question still remains as to
what branch should determine which of the two basic principles controls the
case at issue. Once again, even accepting the importance of the principle of
equal liberty, the step to justifying judicial activism at the expense of democ-
racy is a difficult one.
The best route to a successful justification of activist, nontextual judicial
review in the privacy cases may be through a non-result-based approach. The
strength of the argument from democracy is that it is a process-oriented argu-
ment. Proponents of democracy do not choose results with which they agree
and try to show that vesting final authority in the legislature is the best way to
reach such results. Where the results are as controversial as they have been in
the privacy cases, such an approach is doomed to failure.2 40 Rather, the
approach of the argument from democracy is to rest on the value of democracy
itself. The value is, in a sense, procedural, and the results are justified because
proper procedure was followed in reaching those results.24 '
The best approach to justifying judicial activism in privacy cases is to
identify a countervailing value that is also not result-oriented. If democracy
dictates that choices should be made by the legislature, what is required is a
value that commands that choices, in these cases, be made by the judiciary. The
choice is in the courts not because they are more likely to be right, but because
the value itself dictates that the choice be there.
III. CONSENT AND SOCIAL CONTRACT
The ideas of consent and social contract are linked. In the social con-
tract, the individual contracts with the sovereign or other individuals24 2 to be
238. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
240. While a result-based argument might be offered for democracy, it would be subject
to the same sort of rebuttal Judge Bork has offered for Professor Perry's argument. See infra
note 321 and accompanying text.
241. Even adherents to the argument from democracy do not take a pure democracy
approach. In a Madisonian system, the will of the majority is limited by constitutional stictures.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text and infra note 253 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 262-76 and accompanying text.
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governed by the sovereign. The individual thus consents to the government's
placement of restrictions on his or her rights, but the individual need not con-
sent to all restrictions the sovereign might wish to impose. Indeed, the idea of
natural, inalienable rights is a limitation on the ability to consent to the relin-
quishment of rights and hence a limit to the powers the sovereign may possess
under the contract.
The historical and present-day strength of belief in social contract and
natural rights has already been examined.243 The consent aspect of social con-
tract has a similar historic and present strength. Thomas Paine wrote that the
"authority of the people [is] the only authority on which government has a right
to exist in any country."244 And while the Federalists may have been weak on
commitment to democracy,24 5 Alexander Hamilton wrote: "The fabric of the
American Empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE
PEOPLE.'26 "As a nation, we are committed to the idea that government, to
be ethically defensible, requires the consent of the governed." 47
While we, as a people, may be committed to the requirement that gov-
ernment be by consent, it is difficult to establish any such consent. If there
were a historical social contract, actual consent would have existed, but even in
that case, the consent would be only that of the founding generation. Where
there is no assertion of the historical existence of a social contract but only a
commitment to the ideals of social contract theory, there is no actual consent at
any point.
The usual approach to establishing consent, where actual consent is lack-
ing, is to search for tacit consent. The individual may be argued to consent to
be governed by voting, by continuing to reside in the territory governed, or by
accepting the benefits that flow from the consent of the people to be governed.
Professor Philip Soper has argued that these attempts to find consent fail, and
tacit consent theory is insufficient to establish a moral obligation on the part of
the individual to obey the law.=
While the attempt to find actual or tacit consent may fail, our society still
seems to place great value in that consent and the social contract setting out the
bounds of government authority to which the individual consents. The diffi-
culty is in reconciling the value placed on social contract and consent without
243. See supra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
244. T. PAMNE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN pt. I, at 8 (1794).
245. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
246. A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 58 (P. Fairfield 2d ed. 1981)
(capitalization in original). For Madison's view, see J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at
115 (P. Fairfield 2d ed. 1981) ("[Wle may define a republic to be, or at least may bestow that
name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of
the people....').
247. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1162, 1177-78
(1977). Dean Sandalow then goes on to take a position contrary to that espoused here. He
argues that consent is central to democracy and so consent, like democracy, would lead to the
position that it is the legislature that is empowered by the ideal. Id. at 1178-79. Consent,
however, might be to a government that was not, or was at least not purely, democratic. See
infra notes 262-67 & 325 and accompanying text.
248. See P. SOPER, supra note 67, at 65-67. Soper instead finds the individual's
obligation to obey the law in the good faith effort by the sovereign to take into account the best
interests of the individuals governed.
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being able to establish the existence of either. The value must rest on the use of
both concepts as hypothetical, explanatory devices.
For Rawls, the social contract is a hypothetical, explanatory device. He
calls for the examination of the conditions individuals would agree to under the
veil of ignorance as to the roles they will fill in the resulting societyU 9 Those
conditions serve to define a just society.250
The requirement of consent to which our society seems so committed
must be of a similar nature. If there is no actual consent to be governed,251 and
if attempts to find tacit consent fall, consent must be a hypothetical consent.
The consent is that of the rational individual, under the veil of ignorance, to
agree to subsume his or her will to that of the sovereign.252 While that consent
might be to the unbound will of the sovereign, our society's strong commitment
to natural law concepts and our realization that the sovereign might possibly do
wrong, indicate consent only to the will of a sovereign that is somehow bound.
The real debate, within our society, is not over the existence of these bounds,
but over what the bounds are and how they are to be identified.
Even accepting the importance of social contract and consent values in
our political culture, the question remains as to how those values are to interact
with other important political values. The major competing value appears to be
the value placed in democracy. While that value is admittedly strongly held in
our society, it may not be sufficient to override all other values.
Even Judge Bork, a strong spokesman for democracy, allows democracy
to be overcome by another value. For Bork, our commitment is not to a pure
(representative) democracy but rather to a Madisonian system in which the out-
come of the democratic process controls only when the Constitution does not
deny such control.25 3 Thus, for Bork the commitment to democracy is not as
strong as commitment to the Constitution.
The commitment to the Constitution is widely shared in our political
culture. When the Constitution and democracy conflict, most often people
accept the Constitution as overriding their will. Attacks on Supreme Court
decisions and amendments to the Constitution in response to some of those
decisions show that this is not always true.254 But, even these attacks are usu-
ally phrased as attacks on the Supreme Court's erroneous reading of the
249. See J. RAWLS, supra note 63, at 136-42.
250. Id. at 12-13.
251. Any consent that might be found in the constitutional ratifying conventions would
only be the consent of the founding generation. Presumably, the value we place in the consent
of the governed requires that "governed" denote those who are now governed, rather than those
governed at some point in the past. Even with regard to the founding generation, the consent of
a majority might not be viewed as establishing "the consent of the governed." Rousseau, for
example, appears to have required the unanimous consent of the citizens governed, although his
requirement may have been limited by his views on citizenship. See Rosenfeld, Rousseau's
Unaninous Contract and the Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty, 8 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 83
(Spring 1987).
252. This is not the Founders' idea of consent, but no other form of consent exists. If
consent is to occupy the central place that it does in our political philosophy, it must be
hypothetical consent that fills the role.
253. See Bork, supra note 155, at 2-3.
254. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (the income tax amendment in response to
Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)).
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Constitution, rather than on the Constitution itself, further showing the strength
of our commitment to ihe value of constitutional limitations on the exercise of
democratic processes. Furthermore, the Constitution provides for the amend-
ment process, so it is not clear that such an amendment indicates any lack of
commitment to constitutional values.
The advantage that Judge Bork enjoys over Professor Perry is that
Bork's commitment is to another procedural value, while Perry appeals to the
substantive value of justice. Even given the difficulties of constitutional textual
interpretation, the Constitution's setting forth of procedural limitations is a
model of clarity compared to any delineation of the scope of justice. More
importantly, to agree with Bork does not require agreement with the Court's
views on the issues. We can agree on the procedural value embodied in the
Constitution, that the legislature is to make certain decisions and the individual
others, on a result-neutral basis. That is not possible under Perry's approach.
The value suggested here to counter the value of democracy, that of con-
sent and government under a social contract, has strength similar to Judge
Bork's value of constitutional limitation. Indeed, both primarily focus on
avoiding tyranny. Bork, in describing the Madisonian system, discusses
tyranny of the majority and tyranny of the minority. Each is defined as the
faction, the majority or the minority, governing outside of its proper arena.255
Once again, for Bork, the Constitution defines those proper arenas and the
democratic assumption that, where authority is not denied by the Constitution,
the majority may rule. The values of consent and social contract simply pro-
vide an alternative method for determining the proper arena in which the
majority may govern.
Tyranny may be viewed simply as an excess of government. 256 Such a
view comports, at least, with Judge Bork's tyranny of the majority.257 The dif-
ference between Bork's approach and that taken here is in how one determines
when there is an excess. More expansively than Bork would allow, and admit-
tedly with less definitiveness, excessive government might be defined as gov-
ernment beyond that consented to by the people. The fact that it is a majority
that rules beyond its warrant does not keep that rule from being tyranny. 58
The avoidance of tyranny, limiting the sovereign's power to that which
the people have consented to under the social contract, may even be a more
basic value than the commitment to democracy. It is possible that a people
might consent to a form of government that is not purely democratic. 259
255. Bork, supra note 155, at 3.
256. See, e.g., Blau, Government or Anarchy? in the Debates on the Constitution, 23
TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PIERCE SociEry 507, 508 (Fall 1987).
257. Judge Bork's tyranny of the minority would appear to be an excess of limitation on
majority rule.
258. As the Court said in Citizens' Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
655, 662 (1875):
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government
beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such rights,
which held the lives, the liberty and the property of its citizens subject at all times
to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic
depository of power, is after all but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the
many, of majority, if you choose to call it so, but it is none the less a despotism.
259. See Rosenfeld, supra note 251, at 83.
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Indeed, Rousseau, while viewed as espousing strongly democratic values, actu-
ally favored an elective aristocracy,260 and both Hamilton and some
Antifederalists favored a monarchy over a pure democracy for the United
States.261 But, whether or not the avoidance of tyranny is a more basic value
than adherence to democracy, it is at least a value that stands alongside our
commitment to democracy and might serve to limit the majority's implementa-
tion of its will.
What remains to be examined is how a commitment to government by
consent, the exercise of sovereign authority only as granted under the social
contract, and the avoidance of the tyranny that government beyond that range
would entail, lead to the conclusion that the courts are the proper institution to
determine the scope of consent and the powers of the sovereign under the con-
tract. The examination of that question must be preceded by a discussion of the
contract itself, the parties to the contract, and the location of sovereignty in our
form of government. These structural considerations, rather than any
superiority in moral reasoning, justify the active role for the courts in the pri-
vacy arena.
IV. PARTIES TO THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
If any conclusions are to be based on a consideration of the social con-
tract, the parties to that contract must first be identified. Once again, it must be
remembered that it is not the parties to any historical contract that are sought.
Rather, the parties sought are the hypothetical parties to the hypothetical con-
tract containing the consent of the individual to be governed. There are several
possible choices regarding the parties to the social contract. The contract might
be a multilateral contract amongst all the individuals forming a society. The
social contract theory of Thomas Hobbes is of this variety. 62 The individual
contracts with each other individual that each will give up his own right to self-
governance and accept rule by the sovereign in exchange for the others doing
likewise.263 In that way, each hopes to escape the "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short" life characteristic of the pre-contract state of nature.264
Under this variety of contract, the sovereign would not be a party to the
contract. The sovereign would have no duties to the contracting individuals
and, in Hobbes' view, would have authority that is practically, and perhaps
totally, unrestrained. 265 Even though the sovereign is not a party to the con-
tract, the individual has a contractual duty to the other contractors to obey the
sovereign. It is argued that, for Hobbes, this lack of any right to disobey the
sovereign even extends to there being no right to criticize the sovereign. 266
Hobbes, furthermore, extends these duties and lack of right beyond any original
260. Id.
261. Miller, supra note 12, at 110.
262. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 97 (W. Smith ed. 1965).
263. Id. at 142.
264. Id. at 97.
265. Id. at 151-52.
266. M. LESSNOFF, supra note 55, at 55.
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contracting parties to later generations - there is no option but to accept the
authority of the existing sovereign. 267
A Hobbesian contract is certainly not of the variety that has support in
the contemporary political culture. We are not committed to a sovereign of
unlimited power beyond even the criticism of the citizenry. That, however,
does not require the rejection of the possibility that the contract should be
viewed as between individuals without the sovereign being a party. The social
contract envisioned by John Locke was also among individuals without the
sovereign being a party,268 and Locke's contract views may be seen as the theo-
retical basis for the American Revolution and large parts of our political the-
ory.269
While the sovereign may not have been a party to Locke's social contract,
and may then not have had any duties under the contract, that does not imply
that the sovereign enjoys unlimited rights. What rights the sovereign may have
as the result of the contract among the individuals are limited, and exercising
power beyond those limits Locke called tyranny.270 Thus, one may hypothesize
a social contract to which the parties are the individuals and not the sovereign
and which does comport with our political tradition of limited sovereignty.
An alternative view of the social contract does include the sovereign as a
party to a contract between the people collectively and the sovereign. Such a
contract exists, for example, in the approach taken by Pufendorf.2 71 This
approach, however, requires some action to turn individual people into a col-
lective people capable of then contracting with the sovereign. Since the exer-
cise is admittedly hypothetical, one may be willing to hypothesize an additional
agreement among individuals. However, that contract among individuals might
then be better viewed as the social contract under which each gives up rights
and agrees to be governed by a sovereign. The contract with the sovereign
simply sets the form and identity of the sovereignty. Since the sovereign must
become a party to that second contract in order to enjoy any rights, the
sovereign might also be limited to exercising only those rights granted and may
have contractual duties.
A third possible view of the social contract is that of a series of contracts,
each between an individual and the sovereign. Advantageously, consent to be
governed would be given directly by the individual to the sovereign. Of
course, any claim of historical existence for this sort of social contract raises
great difficulties. In addition to the problem of finding consent or establishing
tacit consent as sufficient consent,2 72 there is the possibility that the individual
contracts might differ. Where the contract is hypothetical, the issue is what the
individual may be presumed to have consented to,273 and problems of actual or
tacit consent and differing contracts do not arise.
267. Id. at 57-58.
268. See J. LOCKE, supra note 95, at ch. VII, §§ 77-94.
269. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
270. J. LOCKE, supra note 95, at ch. XVII, §§ 199-210.
271. See generally S. VON PUFENDORF, DE JuRE NATURAE Er GENTUM LIBRI Oc'rO(C. Oldfather & W. Oldfather trans. 1934).
272. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 294 & 315 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has spoken, in dictum, on the parties to the social
contract. In Munn v. lllinois274 Chief Justice Waite, writing for the Court said:
When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with
some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by
his relations to others, he might retain. "A body politic," as aptly
defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, "is a
social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citi-
zen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be gov-
erned by certain laws for the common good." This does not confer
power upon the whole people to control rights which are purely
and exclusively private, ... but it does authorize the establishment
of laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his
own property as not unnecessarily to injure another.275
Justice Waite's approach differs from Hobbes' and Locke's in that the
individual contracts with the whole people rather than with other individuals.
Depending on where sovereignty is located in our form of government, 76 this
approach may be an example of the third presented. If the sovereignty lies in
the people as a whole, Justice Waite's social contract is a series of contracts
between the individual and the sovereign, giving the sovereign a limited right to
govern.
Whatever social contract approach is adopted, the sovereign has a strong
interest in the social contract. If the contract is between the people collectively
and the sovereign, the sovereign is a party to the social contract. If the contract
is viewed as being between individuals, with each agreeing to be governed by
the sovereign, the sovereign stands as a sort of third-party beneficiary to the
contract.
The discussion of the role of the sovereign in the social contract has, thus
far, not required the identification of the sovereign. Before proceeding, how-
ever, the location of sovereignty under our form of government must be exam-
ined.
Sovereignty is a somewhat elusive concept, particularly in the modern
representative state, and that makes its identification difficult. The older, tra-
ditional view of sovereignty provided a rather straightforward definition. The
sovereign was the political community's final and absolute authority.277 Where
a community was ruled by an absolute monarch or despot, sovereignty was easy
to determine. As the age of absolute monarchy came to an end, a new location
for sovereignty was required. In the British system, in the era of the
American colonies, there had been a shift in sovereignty from the monarch to
the Crown in Parliament. 278 The transition of sovereignty to Parliament con-
tinued to the point where, in 1850, Blackstone could say: "Sovereignty and leg-
islature are indeed controvertible terms.... "279
274. 94 U.S. 113.
275. Id. at 124 (citing Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 143 (1854)).
276. See infra notes 294 & 315-20 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., F. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 1 (2d ed. 1986).
278. See F. MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 39 (1985).
279. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46.
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While one might still argue that British sovereignty is found in
Parliament, the situation in the United States is less clear. With the Court's
authority to declare acts of the legislative and executive branches unconstitu-
tional, and with the legislature's ability, at least in some situations, to override
the rule of the Court through legislation, none of the three branches of federal
government would appear to have final authority to declare law. If such final
authority is located anywhere in our system, it can only be found in the combi-
nation of the two-thirds of both houses of Congress and the three-quarters of
the state legislatures necessary to amend the Constitution.28 0 Such an amend-
ment, where it clearly applies, would bind all branches of government and
serve as the supreme law of the land.281
The amending organs of government, while capable of issuing authorita-
tive statements of law, are sufficiently cumbersome and rarely used that there
might be some objection to locating sovereignty there. Certainly, there would
be no day-to-day exercise of the sovereign power, but such power could cer-
tainly reside with an individual or entity that chooses not to exercise it with any
regularity. It may be that the "[s]overeign is he who decides on the excep-
tion," s8 that is, the entity that exercises authority when extraordinary measures
are required. Amending the Constitution would be such an extraordinary mea-
sure.
If one is willing to allow sovereignty to be shared by those entities that
comprise the amending organs, perhaps sovereignty might more profitably be
thought of as shared even more widely. Professor Corwin finds in the estab-
lishment of our government under the Constitution the recognition of the peo-
ple as sovereign, 83 and Professor Berger notes the position of the Framers that
sovereignty resided in the people.284 The increasing complexity of society,
since the demise of monarchies, has led to changes in the view of sovereignty
either toward the position that sovereignty is in the people or the position that
the concept of sovereignty is no longer necessary. 285 Where governmental
power is fragmented among the Congress, the executive and the judiciary, with
the amending role of the state legislatures thrown in for good measure, finding
sovereignty in the body politic preserves at least some of the concept.28 6
The adoption of a theory of popular sovereignty leads to the question of
280. See U.S. CONST. art. V. There is, of course, also the alternative exercise of
sovereignty by the state legislatures and the constitutional convention. Id.
281. Viewing the amendment as binding all branches of government might lead to a
view of the Constitution itself as sovereign. However, the Constitution seems better viewed as
declared law, rather than the declarer of law traditionally viewed as the sovereign. The binding
power of the Constitution is in its status either as the declaration of the Framers or as embodying
a tradition still strongly adhered to by the people. Its authority comes from the Framers or the
people, and to find sovereignty in the Constitution itself would be to stretch the concept beyond
recognition.
282. C. ScHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (G. Schwab trans. 1985).
283. Corwin, supra note 76, at 409.
284. Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The Activist Flight from the
Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 41 (1986).
285. F. HINSLEY, supra note 277, at 222.
286. See id. at 223.
848 [VOL. 33
HeinOnline -- 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 848 1991
PRIVACY AND SOCIAL CONTRACT
the role of the legislature. The legislature might be viewed as itself being
sovereign, with the attribution of "popular" being due to its members having
been elected by the population. While such a location of sovereignty might
make some sense in the British system, in the American system the people,
speaking through the state legislatures, may call a constitutional convention to
amend the Constitution and undo the federal legislative will. Certainly, the will
of the federal legislature is not final. A sufficiently disapproving population
may, theoretically, counter its enactments.m7
Perhaps the best location of sovereignty is in accord with the common
usage of "popular." The people as a whole are the sovereign. Admittedly, the
power of the sovereign is not directly exercised with great regularity. The
people themselves speak formally only in the electoral process, though less
formally in expressions of public reaction to the acts of the legislature or the
other branches of government. The less formal reaction has its effect on the
legislators and certainly the formal act of the people may change the member-
ship of the legislature, but the body politic does not directly exercise its will in
the traditional sovereign role of dictating the law. The body politic exercises
its power to make law through the agency of the legislature. This is at least
in part the strength of the argument from democracy.289 The elected legisla-
ture is assumed to do the will of the people, and the laws enacted, unless the
populace objects strongly enough to have the law repealed or changed by
amendment, may be taken as expressing the will of the sovereign.
Even with popular sovereignty, the question remains as to the rights of
the individual who disagrees with a particular exercise of the sovereign power.
Even one who objects to Hobbes' view that one may not even criticize the
sovereign, where the sovereign is a monarch or dictator, might agree that the
sovereign is, indeed, unbound in a system based on popular sovereignty.
However, unrestrained popular sovereignty was not accepted by, or in the era
of, the Framers. Popular sovereignty was seen as presenting dangers and as
being in as much need of constraint and limitation as should be imposed on a
sovereign monarch. 29o Furthermore, even strong proponents of the argument
from democracy recognize the possibility of a tyranny of the majority and
allow at least constitutional limitations to bind the exercise of popular
sovereignty. 291
In summary, the political philosophy on which our system is built seems
to include requirements that government be by the consent of the governed, that
sovereignty reside in the body politic, and that that sovereignty be somehow
constrained. The consent to be governed is found in the concept of a hypotheti-
cal social contract between the individual and the sovereign or the people col-
287. The referendum process in state governments may serve the same role with regard
to state legislatures.
288. Even the most direct participation of the body politic in the amendment process is
through the state legislatures calling for a constitutional convention and ratifying its output.
Even here the body politic must speak through a representative organ.
289. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
290. A. VINCENT, THEORIES OF THE STATE 111 (1987). See also supra notes 197-99
and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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lectively. Since the sovereign is the body politic, the question of whether the
contract is with the sovereign or with the people collectively becomes moot.
The Constitution, in the ninth amendment, recognizes constraints on the
sovereign, as does our society's general recognition of rights against the gov-
ernment. Those limitations might best be viewed as setting out areas in which
the individual in the hypothetical contract does not consent to be governed. If
there are areas of our lives in which we do not agree to give up our individual
freedom of action and subsume our will to that of the sovereign, then any
exercise of sovereignty in those areas is illegitimate as being in excess of the
authority granted the sovereign under the social contract. The greatest diffi-
culty with this position still remains. Who should identify those areas in which
individual freedom of action is not ceded under the hypothetical contract?
V. WHO DECIDES?
The argument from democracy enjoys an advantage over Perry's appeal
to justice in determining which branch of government is to decide the bounds of
legislative power. The argument from democracy appeals to procedure,292
while the argument from justice appeals to result. While there may be dis-
agreement over which branch has best promoted, and will best promote, justice,
it is clear that democratic values favor decision by the legislature. The
procedure of legislative determination itself promotes democracy. The best
counter to this conclusion is not an appeal to better results but rather to another
value, consent and social contract, that is procedural. If the process of judicial
determination of legislative power promotes the values of consent and social
contract, a value has been identified to counter the admittedly forceful argu-
ment from democracy.
The difficulty in allowing the legislature to define the scope of its own
power is, as Professor Dworkin says, that "decisions about rights against the
majority are not issues that in fairness ought to be left to the majority."2 93
Dworkin's view is contained within a discussion of constitutionalism and sug-
gests that the legislature has no special charge to make constitutional decisions.
However, the same point may be made against the claim that the legislature
should be the entity to determine the scope of its own power, even when that
power is not expressly limited by the Constitution.
The position argued for here has been that in raising the issue of deci-
sional privacy, the individual is claiming that the legislature has exercised
power beyond that granted under the hypothetical social contract. If the hypo-
thetical individual has not consented to be governed in all aspects of his or her
life, then the power of the legislature is bound by the terms of that hypothetical
consent. The bounds expressed in the Constitution certainly place some limits
on that power, but to hold that those textual limitations are the only limitations
ignores both the ninth amendment and our society's long commitment to natural
rights beyond those expressed in the Constitution.
Since the legislature's bounds are to be determined by the terms of a
hypothetical consent, those bounds will not be well defined. While the argu-
292. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
293. R. DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 142.
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ment from democracy uses this fact to argue for legislative supremacy, that fact
may be seen, instead, to argue for judicial determination. The argument is,
after all, one between the individual and the legislature, where the legislature is
presumed to speak for the sovereign body politic. If the argument is one in
which the individual contests the rights of the sovereign under the social
contract, it must be noted that the sovereign is either a party to that contract or
a third-party beneficiary to the contract.294 The adherent to the argument from
democracy, then, is arguing for the position that one of the parties to the con-
tract ought to be allowed to determine its powers under the contract.
Placing the sovereign, or its agent, the legislature, in such a position -
that is allowing a party to be the judge of its own cause - cuts against the grain
of American justice. As the Supreme Court said in Penman v. Wayne,295 one
of its earliest cases, "surely the legislature could not mean to make a man thejudge both of fact and law in his own cause, and that without appeal." 296
Shortly thereafter, Justice Chase, in Calder v. Bull,297 opined that with regard
to "a law that makes a man a judge in his own cause...: It is against all reason
and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, there-
fore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it."298
The position was shared by the philosophical forefathers of our system of
government. John Locke argued that one of the problems in the state of nature
is that "the inconveniences ... must certainly be great where men may be judges
in their own case, since it is to be imagined that he who was so unjust as to do
his brother an injury will scarcely be so just as to condemn himself for it."299
The Federalists stated the same proposition even in the context of legislation:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause: because
his interest would certainly bias his judgment and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with greater reason, a body
of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet
what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so
many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of
single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citi-
zens?300
The principle that a man should not be the judge of his own cause is
clearly fundamental.301 Rawls may even be seen to have taken the principle as
294. As seen, supra note 291 and accompanying text, the distinction between the
sovereign as party and the sovereign as third-party beneficiary may not be relevant where there is
popular sovereignty.
295. 1 U.S. 261 (1788).
296. Id. at 263.
297. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 388 (1798).
298. Id. at 383 (emphasis and capitalization in original).
299. J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, in OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT:
AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §
13, at 10 (E. Barker ed. 1967).
300. J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 18 (P. Fairfield 2d ed. 1981).
301. In addition to cases quoted in text, see, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,
197 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep.
646, 652 (1610)) ("[W]e might start with a firstprinciple: '[No man shall be ajudge in his own
cause."); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 n.17 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Report on Committee on Ministers' Powers, Cmd. 4060,
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the very definition of justice. The purpose of the veil of ignorance is to keep
those in the initial position from knowing the roles they will fill. They will
then establish a just system because they are unable to identify and judge their
own causes. Yet, the proponent of the argument from democracy would place
the legislature in the position of judging its own cause with regard to the defi-
nition of its own powers under the social contract.
If the legislature should not be placed in the position of defining its own
powers, the question remains as to who or what should. The individual cannot
be left to make the determination. The individual raising the issue is no longer
the hypothetical individual, but an actual person. If each such person is allowed
to define the legislative power with regard to the areas in which he or she con-
sents to be governed, the obvious result would be anarchy. It is the hypotheti-
cal social contract and the consent of the hypothetical individual party to that
contract that limit the scope of legislative authority. The view of any particular
individual should not be dispositive, especially where that individual is also a
party to the suit and would become the judge of his or her own cause.
To avoid anarchy, the entity to make decisions with regard to the scope
of the social contract must be some recognized, officially constituted body, and
its decisions taken as binding on all. Its decisions as to the areas in which the
hypothetical individual agrees to be governed must override the contrary views
of any individuals who would further limit legislative authority. The official
status is required for the population to know what view is to control.
If the officially constituted body to make these social contract decisions is
to be a branch of government, it should be that branch that is least a party to
the social contract. The decision must be made by that branch most removed
from the sovereignty. If the sovereignty is popular, the branch to define social
contract rights should be that branch most insulated from the popular will. The
insulation of the courts from the popular will, that the adherents to the argu-
ment from democracy see as making the courts the inappropriate body to make
such determinations, actually is what puts the courts in the best position to
determine the terms of the social contract.302 If either of the political branches
75-80) ("Three principles of 'natural justice' were stated to be that 'a man may not be a judge in
his own cause' ... "); Spencer v. Lapsley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 264, 266 (1857) ("The act of
Congress proceeds upon an acknowledgment of the maxim, 'that a man should not be the judge
in his own cause' ..."); American General Ins. Co. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir. 1979)
(quoting Day v. Savadge, Hob. 84 (K.B. 1614)) ("'even an Act of Parliament made against
Natural Equity, as to make a Man Judge in his own Cause, is void in itself..."); NLRB v.
Riverside Mfg. Co., 119 F.2d 302, 305 n.2 (5th Cir. 1941) (noting "principles, at once of
natural right and of constitutional law, that no man may be a judge in his own cause...");
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 112 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1940) (same language);
American Creosote Works, Inc. v. Powell, 298 F. 417, 422 (1924) ("Courts have been everjealous to assert and enforce the principle that no man can be a judge in his own cause...");
Hodgson v. District No. Five, United Mine Workers of Am., 353 F. Supp. 108, 115 (W.D. Pa.
1973) ("It is fundamental in our law that a man cannot judge his own cause...').
302. While no distinction has been made between state and federal courts thus far in the
argument, at this point there may be an important distinction. If state supreme court justices are
elected, and must stand for re-election, they may not be sufficiently insulated from the popular
sovereignty. The decision should then rest in the federal courts. However, even where state
supreme court justices must stand for re-election, they are in no worse a position than the
legislature insofar as being removed from the sovereignty. In fact, the length ofjustices' terms
and, perhaps, their statewide constituencies may provide better insulation than the legislator has.
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makes the decision, the decision may be taken as that of the sovereign, the
populace, with regard to its own cause. Only the judiciary is sufficiently
insulated for its decision not to be taken as that of the sovereign populace.303
The argument is very similar to that made by Professor Ely. While
rejecting the application of his views to the privacy arena, he argued for a
strong role for the courts in the protection of procedural values. In looking at
situations in which there was argued to be a breakdown in the representational
aspects of our government, Ely said:
Obviously our elected representatives are the last persons
we should trust with identification of ... these situations.
Appointed judges, however, are comparative outsiders in our gov-
ernmental system.... This does not give them some special pipeline
to the genuine values of the American people: in fact it goes far to
ensure that they won't have one. It does, however, put them in a
position objectively to assess claims - though no one could
suppose the evaluation won't be full of judgment calls - that
either by clogging the channels of change or by acting as acces-
sories to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are
not representing the interests of those whom the system presup-
poses they are. o4
Here, too, elected representatives are the last persons we should trust to
identify the situations in which legislation goes beyond the authority granted by
the contract. We should instead turn to the comparative outsider - the
judge.305 That judge may not have a special insight into the social contract and
certainly judgment calls will be required. But, the judge is in a position objec-
tively to assess the claim that the legislature has imposed a tyranny of the
majority by legislating where the sovereign is not given the authority to rule.30 6
The argument presented, though weakened, may still favor decision by state supreme courts
rather than state legislators, with the United States Supreme Court as final arbiter.
303. Professor Perry has used this political insularity to suggest that the courts are in the
position to make the best (the most prophetic or just) decision. See Perry, supra note 135, at
1195. The position taken here is not that insularity makes it more likely that the courts will find
the just result, but rather that, because of that insularity, the just procedure puts the decision in
the courts.
304. J. ELY, supra note 197, at 103.
305. It may be argued that the judge is not an outsider to the government and, thus, is in
a sense called on to judge the cause of an entity of which he or she is a part. But, the
government need not be treated as monolithic. It is the sovereign that must not be allowed to
define its own powers. The sovereignty resides in, or is exercised through, the political
branches of the government. The judge is a relative outsider to sovereignty and is in the best
position to judge the limits of sovereignty.
306. Professor McConnell has argued that the judge has no better charge to "improv[e]
upon the Constitution" than the Army Chief of Staff. McConnell, supra note 101, at 96.
Indeed, the Chief of Staff might be seen as even more removed from the sovereignty than the
federal judge. The Chief of Staff does, however, serve at the pleasure of the popularly elected
President and, in that sense, does serve the sovereign populace. Of course, the Chief of Staff
might refuse to continue to recognize the authority of the political branches and isolate himself or
herself from the body politic. Since some would argue a usurpation by the courts in the privacy
arena, the usurping Chief of Staff might seem the proper analogy. However, the usurping Chief
of Staff may better be seen as having assumed sovereignty rather than as having isolated himself
or herself from the sovereignty. Some might say the same of the courts, when the courts take
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The argument, as presented thus far, speaks to the role of the federal
courts with regard to Congress and, to only a slightly lesser degree, the role of
state courts with regard to state legislatures.307 Many of the more controversial
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have, however, involved
the federal Supreme Court striking down state legislation. Some additional
explanation is required to show why the federal courts should play such a role
in defining the limits of state sovereignty.
The best established source for the power of the federal judiciary to
strike down state laws would be constitutional. It has been argued that the ninth
amendment applies to the states and that the retained natural rights the amend-
ment recognizes are retained against the states as well as against the federal
government. 308 Even if the ninth amendment did not, when ratified, apply to
the states, the fourteenth amendment might be viewed as protecting against state
interference those rights recognized by the ninth amendment as retained against
the federal government. Such protection might most naturally be found in the
fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause,.3 9 but that route would
seem foreclosed by the Slaughterhouse Cases.310 The constitutional source
relied on, however, has been the fourteenth amendment due process clause, 311
perhaps in combination with the claim that that clause may protect the nontex-
tual retained rights recognized by the ninth amendment.312
The problem with asserting a constitutional source for the federal judi-
ciary in invalidating state statutes on privacy grounds is the weakness of the
claim to a constitutional basis. The approach taken here has been to admit that
there is no textual constitutional grant of such power to the courts. Rather, the
approach has been to recognize the existence of certain rights and values and
then to argue that those values dictate that it be the courts that define the bounds
of those areas open to legislation. If it is not the Constitution that gives the fed-
eral courts their power over Congress in this area, the Constitution will not
give the federal courts such power over state legislatures. Rather, the factors
that make the judiciary the better branch of government to define privacy
interests must be shown also to apply in comparing the federal courts to the
state legislatures.
over and operate a school system or a prison system, though clearly there is not the assumption
of sovereignty that might be asserted by a Chief of Staff.
Perhaps more importantly, the role argued for the courts here is that of striking down
statutory law. The effect is to limit rather than expand sovereignty. The Chief of Staff might
take an analogous role by refusing to use the military to enforce a particular statute. While such
a refusal might lead to public disapproval, as have some court decisions, the specter is not as
grim as McConnell's vision of the Chief of Staff making positive law.
307. The political theory should carry over to a consideration of the states. Any
references to the Constitution have been to the federal Constitution rather than state constitutions.
However, none of the argument has actually been constitutional. Instead, the Constitution has
been used to illustrate the strength of certain values within our society. Those values should
serve as limitations on state sovereignty as well as on federal sovereignty.
308. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 109, at 248-49; B. PATrERSON, supra note 86, at 36-
37; Levinson, Constitutional Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CIl.-KENT L. REv. 131,
143-44 (1988). But see G. MCDOWELL, supra note 79, at 110-11.
309. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 308, at 145-47.
310. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.
311. See supra notes 23-54 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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The argument with regard to the judiciary and the legislature was based
on a claim that the decision with regard to the areas in which the individual
consents to be governed by the popular sovereign should be made by the branch
most removed from that sovereignty. When comparing the state legislatures
with the federal judiciary, it should be clear that the federal judiciary is further
removed from the sovereignty. Indeed, the argument is even more convincing
than the comparison of the federal judiciary and Congress. The state legisla-
tures may be closer to the popular sovereignty of the states than the Congress is
to the popular sovereignty of the nation; that is, the smaller constituencies of
state legislators may make them more responsive to the popular will. 313
Furthermore, the state judiciaries may not be sufficiently removed from the
popular sovereignty to make the state courts proper decisionmakers. They may
not have the independence necessary to be considered a non-party to the issue of
consent to be governed. 314
The areas in which the individual agrees to be governed under the hypo-
thetical social contract may vary with changes in the concept of the hypothetical
individual. If principles with regard to retained or natural rights vary from
state to state, then the social contract and the legislative powers of the popular
sovereign might also vary from state to state. However, the hypothetical social
contract is not simply the dominant view of the powers the sovereign should
have.315 The terms of the hypothetical contract are philosophical, rather than
sociological or historical, issues. The resolution of these issues is of national,
or broader,316 scope and not to be left to the states.317
VI. CONCLUSION
The argument presented leads to the conclusion that when an individual
claims that a statute violates his or her right to privacy, the courts, especially
the federal courts, are in a better position than the legislatures to delimit that
right to privacy. The privacy claim is best seen as a statement about the social
contract and the rights granted the sovereign therein. The sovereign, as a ben-
eficiary under, or party to, the social contract, is not the entity that should have
the authority to interpret the social contract. Since sovereignty in our system is
in the people, the legislature, speaking for the majority, is the organ generally
exercising sovereignty. 318 The legislature, then, should not have the authority
to determine the scope of authority given the sovereign. Instead, that branch of
government most removed from the sovereign, the courts, should make such
decisions.
313. See J. MADISON, supra note 300, at 22-23.
314. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 121, at 1740.
315. Were that the case, the popular sovereign would be the judge of its own cause.
316. An international court of human rights would be even further removed from the
popular sovereignty and might be the better judge of the areas in which the citizens of a country
have consented to be ruled by their national sovereign. It may be that the answer should not
vary from country to country. If there is variance, it would be due to variations in initial
conditions that would lead hypothetical, rational individuals to give differing powers to the
sovereigns.
317. See Conkle, Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Judicial
Finality, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 9,29 (1985).
318. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
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The argument has not been result-oriented and has, in fact, given no
direction to a court embarking on the effort suggested here. Some general
conclusions with regard to direction might, however, be suggested by the
argument for the courts' authority. Since the claims that justify the court in
exercising this nontextual review are claims that an exercise of sovereignty is
not consented to under the social contract, resolution of the claims would seem
to depend on an examination of the social contract. As Professor Laycock has
noted, claims to autonomy or the right to privacy are strongest when the indi-
vidual is acting alone and have only slightly less strength in the context of
small, voluntary associations, such as those consisting of adult sexual part-
ners.319 Since, at bottom, the utility of the social contract is the governance of
interactions between people that may lead to violence or exploitation,320 acts
that solely or primarily affect the individual actor or a small group of volun-
tarily interacting equals are the most suspect.
Certainly, the courts will have to exercise judgment in these determina-
tions. While the courts may not have clear guidance in interpreting the scope
of textual rights, the task of determining the areas in which the individual has
not consented to be governed under the hypothetical social contract is even
more difficult. It is, however, a decision that must be made by some entity. If
the courts refuse to make such determinations, the decisions will rest with the
legislature as representative of the stronger party to the contract and having the
capacity to force the individual to adhere to its interpretation of the contract.
Where judges and justices are called on to make such philosophical
determinations, there is bound to be disagreement over the conclusions they
reach. Professor Bork suggests that possibility puts one who argues for judicial
activism in privacy cases in an untenable philosophical position.321 Bork may
be correct if the basis for the courts' authority is based on agreement with the
courts' decisions. Bork's argument is limited to one who argues for the
supremacy of the judiciary because their decisions are correct, and assumes that
correctness is nothing more than agreement with the moral views of the
speaker. In that case, if a~decision is handed down with which the speaker dis-
agrees, the speaker must then deny the authority of the court.
The argument addressed by Professor Bork is not the basis for the
courts' authority argued for here. Here, authority is found in the institutional
position of the courts as most removed from the popular sovereignty. That
argument is not affected by a court reaching a decision with which an adherent
to the argument disagrees. Such an adherent is in the same position an adherent
to the argument from democracy finds himself or herself in when the legisla-
ture passes a statute with which he or she disagrees. 322 To believe that the court
319. Laycock, supra note 109, at 374-76.
320. See, e.g., T. HOBBES, DE CIVE ch. 1, at 24 ("The origin of all great and lasting
societies consisted not in the mutual good will men had toward each other, but in the mutual fear
they had of each other.").
321. Bork, supra note 155, at 6.
322. The nature of the disagreement will differ. One who disagrees with the legislature
may disagree with policy or the balance struck between competing policies. One who disagrees
with the courts in the arena of privacy has a philosophical disagreement over the scope of the
hypothetical social contract.
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or the legislature is wrong does not require one to believe that it is not the
proper body to have made the decision.
If it is not clear from the presentation, it should be stated that this has not
been, nor was it intended to have been, an historical argument.323 Any refer-
ences to the Framers were not to show the actual inclusion of any particular
view within the Constitution, as Professor Richards would have it324 Rather,
only the acceptance of the notions of natural rights and social contract were
noted. Even if those views had not been accepted by the Framers, the philo-
sophical and current popular strength of the view that government is justified
by consent would be a sufficient basis for the remainder of the argument.
What has been presented here is a third value to stand alongside, and
compete with, constitutionalism and democracy. Constitutionalism, democracy
and privacy are independent values that may at times agree and at other times
conflict.325 Just as the continued acceptance of constitutionalism justifies the
overriding of democratic action, the acceptance of government by consent and
the possibility that the sovereign might try to govern in an area not consented to
in the hypothetical social contract justify judicial activism in the privacy cases.
In the privacy cases the values behind privacy and the value of democracy do
conflict. Where the courts step in and come down on the side of individual
rights, they have thwarted the democratic process, but they have done so in the
protection of other values that are at least as basic as that of democracy. Were
the courts always to refuse to do so, they would be sacrificing government by
consent on the altar of democracy.
323. Professor Berger would seem to require that all arguments in this area be
historically based. He says: "As becomes 'philosophers,' activists make virtually no mention of
the constitutional history, a confession that it reads against them." Berger, supra note 284, at
15. History does not, however, by itself justify a government. If the founding generation had
installed an absolute monarchy, and present-day society chaffed under that rule, the historical
status of that monarchy and the decision imposing it would notjustify its rule over a society that
no longer consented to such rule. Constitutional history does play a strong role in judicial and
legislative decisionmaking, as well as in the public acceptance of those decisions. However, that
role is justified by the continued acceptance of our constitutional values, and of the Constitution
itself, rather than simply because the values were held by certain individuals in a particular past
era.
324. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. See also Berger, supra note 284, at
38 (commenting on Richards' deficiency as an historian).
325. Cf. A. VINCENT, supra note 290, at 81 ("Constitutionalism has no intrinsic
connection with liberalism or democracy.... Similarly, popular sovereignty ideas have no
necessary connection with constitutionalism or in fact democracy.").
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